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Abstract
Insurance industry is an important component of the US economy. In 2013,
the industry sold policies worth $ 1.8 trillion and employed 2 million people. Most
of the US population has exposure to different kinds of insurance like automobile,
health, life etc. which makes the sector politically sensitive. The incentives that
various stakeholders face will be critical for the sector. Hence I use my dissertation as
an opportunity to explore how the political and regulatory processes affect the policy
outcomes.
In the first chapter, I examine how two different selection systems for state in-
surance regulators, election and appointment, affect policy outcomes in a market with
multiple competing firms. In the United States, in some states, insurance regulators
are elected (by ballot) while in other states they are appointed (by the Governor).
Traditional theory suggests that elected regulators are pro-consumers while appointed
regulators are pro-industry. I collected data on premiums paid by an individual on an
auto insurance policy across 48 states to show that elected regulators choose policies
salient for most consumers (e.g. lower premiums) in contrast to appointed regulators
(higher premiums). This impact is larger and statistically significant in the counties
where a majority of state’s population is concentrated. This is because the marginal
cost of reaching out to voters is much lower in areas with higher concentration of
population. State level data confirms that premiums per capita written by auto in-
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surance firms is much lower in states with elected regulators as compared to states
with appointed regulators. Different states have given insurance regulators varying
degrees of regulatory powers to fix premiums on automobile insurance premiums.
The second chapter captures the response of the industry to arbitrary fix-
ing of premiums on auto insurance policies. Elected regulators tend to prefer lower
premiums on auto insurance policies as compared to appointed regulators. Since the
premiums are regulated, insurance firms compete on the unregulated aspects of the
market. Competition between firms ensure that the extra revenue earned by charging
higher premiums (in states with appointed regulators) is used to other a better prod-
uct (higher payments on claims filed by policyholders). Hence, an elected regulator
offers a bundle of lower prices and inferior product. And an appointed regulator does
not ensure pro-industry outcomes as there are no systematic differences in profits in
states with elected or appointed regulators (as shown by previous research).
The third chapter of the thesis examines the influence of interest groups on
effective insurance premium tax rate. I focus on market concentration as a proxy for
the ability of the firms in an industry to organize into an interest group to capture
regulation. I find that states with a higher degree of market concentration in the
insurance industry tend to have lower effective insurance premium tax rate. To es-
tablish causality, I use the coast to area ratio in the state as a source of exogenous
variation in the market concentration. This is because exposure to the coast increases
the probability of catastrophic events such as hurricanes which leads to the exit of
several insurance firms. I find empirical evidence that a 1 percent increase in market
concentration is associated with a 0.6 percent reduction in the effective insurance
premium tax rate.
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Chapter 1
Political Economy of Automobile
Insurance Premiums: Elected vs
Appointed Regulators
In 2013, about $1.8 trillion1 were paid in premiums on insurance policies sold
across the United States. This amounts to about 11.5 percent of the US GDP. The
insurance industry employs about 2 million people which is about 1.3 percent of the
US labor force2. A large fraction of the US population has exposure to different kinds
of insurance like health, life, auto, etc - underlying the importance of the sector.
About 50 state regulators known as Insurance Commissioners 3 between themselves
have significant influence over this industry which in monetary value is big enough
to be the 11th largest economy in the world. The role of these regulators is fur-
ther strengthened by the McCarran-Ferguson Act (1945) which made the business of
insurance exempt from most federal regulation, including federal antitrust laws.
1Source of this figure is the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
2As per 2013 figures.
3Also known as Superintendents or Directors.
1
These commissioners are responsible for protecting the consumers, ensuring
healthy competition within the industry and ensuring that insurance firms are finan-
cially solvent. However, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) have demonstrated that
regulators often act in their own self-interest and respond to interest groups and elec-
toral pressures. Crain & McCormick (1984) and Besley & Coate (2000) showed that
the set of policies chosen by the regulators is motivated by their selection mechanism.
Elected regulators have to face electoral pressures and hence tend to be pro-consumers.
With appointed regulators, policy becomes bundled (and confused) with other pol-
icy issues the appointing politicians oversee. However, as voters have only one vote
and regulatory issues are not always salient for most voters, there are incentives on
the part of the appointed regulator to respond to interest groups rather than voter
interests.
In 11 states, the insurance commissioner is selected through a statewide sim-
ple majority election while, in other states, the commissioner is appointed by the
Governor or (the state government). These commissioner(s) have the responsibility
to regulate and monitor a large number of firms. According to National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), in 2013, Alaska had 733 domestic and licensed for-
eign insurers while Wisconsin had about 2,102 domestic and foreign insurers. Hence,
state insurance markets in the United States provide an excellent opportunity to ex-
tend the the analysis of the theory of elected vs appointed regulators to a market
characterized by the presence of a large number of competing firms. Previous studies
have looked at monopolistic markets like utilities (Crain & McCormick 1984; Besley
& Coate 2000) or non market environments like judiciary (Hanssen 1999; Lim 2013),
city treasurers (Whalley 2013) and city treasurers (Makowsky & Sanders 2013).
I particularly focus on the automobile insurance markets. Premiums on auto-
mobile insurance is a salient issue for most voters when they vote to elect an insurance
2
commissioner. This is because of the almost universal ownership of cars in the United
States. According to Federal Highway Administration, there were 84 registered ve-
hicles per 100 people in the United States in 2013. It becomes necessary for drivers
to purchase an automobile insurance to cover the risks associated with driving a car.
Besides, most states (except New Hampshire) have made it mandatory for the drivers
to purchase automobile insurance for their vehicle. As a consequence, in 2014, the
insurance industry was able to sell automobile insurance policies worth $ 183 billion
4 in the United States.
To assess the impact of the selection mechanism of insurance commissioner
on automobile insurance premiums, I have web scrapped a website maintained by a
major insurance company to sell automobile insurance to individual drivers online.
This website requires the individual buying a policy to provide a detailed information
about himself (e.g. the driving history, age and marital status, etc.), the car (e.g.
model, make etc.) and the preferred liability coverage. The website then uses this
information to generate a quote or a monthly premium for the individual looking to
purchase a policy. Various major automobile insurance companies maintain similar
websites to attract a growing number of consumers who prefer to purchase products
online. The company whose website I have web scraped sells automobile insurance
policy in all the states in the United States. Hence, I was able to collect quotes on
an insurance policy for a hypothetical driver living in 48 states and 3047 counties. I
was not able to collect data for 3 states (Wyoming, Alaska and Montana) because of
the legal constraints imposed by the insurance company on data collection.
I have collected a variety of quotes. First, I have collected quotes for a
policy purchased by an individual who represents the median voter. This is because
traditional political models predict that politicians cater to the median voter. Second,
4Insurance Information Institute http://www.iii.org/table-archive/20967.
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I have collected quotes on the cheapest policy (providing minimum liability coverage)
which an individual can purchase to insure his car. This is because for a driver
looking to buy the cheapest available insurance, automobile insurance premiums will
be a salient issue when voting to elect an insurance commissioner. Hence, an elected
commissioner should, theoretically, pay attention to the pricing of policies providing
minimum coverage. Besides, different states have a different mandatory minimum
liability coverage requirement for drivers purchasing policies in their state. Third,
I have collected quotes on a policy which provides similar liability coverage to the
individual as he moves across different states and counties. This is because the median
voter would prefer a different insurance policy in different states and counties based
on local conditions. Fourth, I have also collected quotes on a policy purchased by a
rich voter. This allows us to observe whether the insurance commissioner caters only
to the median voter.
I find evidence that the selection mechanism of an insurance commissioner has
a causal impact on the determination of auto insurance premiums. Premiums paid
on automobile insurance is a salient issue for most voters when they vote to elect an
insurance commissioner. Hence elected commissioners have an incentive to suppress
the premiums drivers have to pay on their automobile insurance. This leads to lower
automobile insurance premiums in states with elected commissioners as opposed to
states with appointed commissioners. However, this impact is substantially higher
and statistically significant for drivers living in neighborhoods located in most popu-
lous counties (I call them urban counties5). In the sparsely populated counties (other
than the urban counties), this impact is smaller in magnitude and statistically in-
significant. However, there is still a negative bias on premiums for states with elected
commissioners. These results are consistent for the quotes collected on a policy pre-
5Counties where 50 percent of a state’s population is concentrated.
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ferred by a median voter, a policy providing minimum coverage, a policy providing
constant liability coverage and the policy preferred by the rich voter.
These results are explained by the fact that an insurance commissioner is
elected through a simple majority rule in statewide elections. These election are
generally bipartisan in nature with two candidates in the fray affiliated to Republican
and Democratic parties. The candidate who gets more than 50 percent of the votes
polled across the state wins the election. About 50 percent of the US population (in
my sample) is concentrated in 307 counties while the other half of US population is
disbursed in about 2700 counties. The marginal benefit of using resources to convince
voters is potentially higher in counties where a significant proportion of the population
lives. Alternatively, marginal cost of reaching out to a voter is substantially lower
in counties where most of the population is located. Hence, it is in the interest of
an insurance commissioner to pay greater attention to clusters where a majority of
state’s population is concentrated.
The selection mechanism of an insurance commissioner is exogenous to changes
in automobile insurance premiums. This is because it is rare for a state to switch
from an elected to appointed position or vice versa. I have collected historical infor-
mation from state constitutions and state insurance offices to show that in the past
100 years, only three states have switched despite substantial variation in the eco-
nomic and political environment6. I also provide a difference of means t-test (Table
13) to show that there is no substantial difference in the states having an elected
commissioner and states having an appointed commissioner which might be driving
the results. These states are also not different based on their political orientation.
The empirical results emerging from the individual level data are confirmed
by state-level aggregates based on data provided by the Auto Insurance Database
6Please see section 3 for a detailed discussion.
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Report7. Evidence suggests that auto insurance premium per registered vehicle is
lower in states with elected commissioners. However, in states with appointed com-
missioners, higher premium per vehicle does not translate into additional profits for
the industry (Grace 2008) as suggested by the theory of elected vs appointed regu-
lators. This theory suggests that elected regulators are pro-industry. However, in a
market with several competing firms where prices are regulated, individual firms can
use the additional revenues to spend on unregulated domains (e.g. product quality,
marketing) to attract consumers. Hence, competition would force the firms to operate
on zero profits.
State level data makes it possible to examine the premiums written by the
industry on the different components of an automobile insurance policy, namely lia-
bility coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage. Liability coverage is
the coverage that protects other people and their properties if the policyholder causes
an accident. It is mandatory in most states. Collision coverage protects the car of
the policy holder in case the policyholder hits other vehicles, people or non-moving
objects like fences, poles or kiosks. It covers the policyholder, regardless of who was
at fault in an accident. Comprehensive coverage covers everything that collision cov-
erage does not and is often referred to as “other than Collision”. It protects the
policyholder from theft, fire, vandalism and severe weather conditions.
In 2011, the value of the automobile insurance policies sold (or premiums
written) in the United States was about $ 150 bn. Liability coverage component of
automobile policies alone accounted for about $ 100 bn amounting to about 65 percent
of the total revenues. Premiums from collision coverage accounted for another 26
percent of the revenues while comprehensive coverage accounted for only 10 percent
of the total revenues of the industry. Clearly, most people prefer to purchase liability
7Published by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
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coverage (as it is mandatory) or collision coverage. I find evidence that premiums
written on liability coverage per registered vehicle by the industry are substantially
lower in states with elected commissioners after controlling for a variety of factors.
Similarly, I also find that premiums written on collision coverage per registered vehicle
are lower in states with elected commissioners. However, I find no impact of the
selection mechanism of the insurance commissioner on comprehensive coverage per
registered vehicle. This is partly because few people prefer to buy comprehensive
coverage. Hence, it ceases to be electorally salient for an elected commissioner to
monitor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a section
on literature review of the theory of elected vs appointed regulators and automobile
insurance rate regulation. Section 2 provides background information on the role of
state legislature and the regulatory powers of the insurance commissioners. Section 3
provides data sources and deals with potential endogeneity issues with the selection
of the Insurance Commissioner. Section 4 gives econometric specification and section
5 provides a discussion on the results.
1.1 Literature Review
1.1.1 Elected vs. Appointed Regulators
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) laid down a general theory of economic
regulation. Stigler (1971) suggested that interest groups which are able to organize
themselves at lower costs are able to persuade the regulator to set policies which are
of benefit to them. Hence, he argues that it is the industry which captures regulation
because the industry is able to organize itself into an interest group in a cost effective
7
manner. On the other hand, consumers are rarely able to organize as an interest group
because the costs are much higher. Peltzman (1976) suggested that government tries
to maximize electoral support, and the interest groups compete by offering political
support for the legislation they benefit from.
In the 1980s, Crain & Mccormick focused on the selection mechanisms of
regulators. They developed a Peltzman style theoretical framework and provided
empirical evidence on the impact of different institutional settings on regulatory out-
comes. They argue that when election or re-election becomes a less important aspect
of the regulator’s optimization problem, his choices will tend to favor higher regulated
prices. They find empirical evidence that average residential prices of electricity are
marginally statistically significantly lower in states with directly elected Public Util-
ity Commissioners. They also find higher rates of return for regulated firms in states
with appointed utility commissioners. Besley & Coate (2003) came up with similar
empirical evidence with utility commissioners. They note that elected commissioners
are going to be more closely aligned with voters’ interests, but the appointed commis-
sioners are, in turn, appointed by elected officials. However they explain that when
regulator is appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled (and confused) with other
policy issues the appointing politicians oversee. However, as voters have only one
vote and regulatory issues are not always salient for most voters, there are incentives
on the part of the appointed regulator to respond to interest groups rather than voter
interests. In contrast, it seems obvious that if regulators are elected, their stance on
regulation is the only important issue so that the electoral incentive for the parties is
to back a pro-voter or pro-consumer candidate.
Claire Lim (2013) investigates judiciary and concludes that under appoint-
ment, the preference of the median voter in the entire state is reflected in policy
outcomes while local preferences are reflected under election. Hence she suggests ev-
8
idence that sentencing decisions of the judges reflected that they were influenced by
their private interests. Hanssen (1999) compares litigation in elected and appointed
state courts and finds, on balance, more litigation where judges are appointed, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that judicial independence has a net positive effect on
decision uncertainty. Makowsky & Sanders (2013) study the political economy of the
residential property value assessment under Proposition 2 1/2 and find that appraised
values grow more slowly in municipalities with elected assessors. Alexander Whalley
(2013) finds that appointive treasurers reduce a city’s cost of borrowing by 13% to
23%. Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through
the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates.
1.1.2 Regulation of Auto Insurance
In the literature on regulation of automobile insurance, the relevant studies
are Tennyson (2001), Harrington (2002) and Grace et al. (2008). Harrington (2002)
analyzed the effect of prior approval rate regulation on automobile insurance premi-
ums from 1972 to 1998 and concluded that in the long run, rate regulation did not
significantly reduce prices for consumers. The paper takes inverse loss ratio of the
industry ( for the auto insurance segment) as a measure of price. Similarly, Cummins,
Phillips and Tennyson (2001) suggest price regulation has a disparate impact.
Grace (2008) takes into account the career incentives of insurance commission-
ers (revolving door hypothesis) using ’unit prices’ as a proxy for prices that consumers
face8. Grace et al (2008) finds that after taking into account the backgrounds and
future employment choices of the regulators, states with rate regulation had higher
average insurance prices. They estimate that the unit price of insurance in regulated
8Unit prices for a given state are calculated as the total state premiums earned divided by the
sum of total state direct losses and loss adjustment expenses plus policyholder dividend paid off
private passenger auto insurance.
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states when the commissioner is someone who desired higher elective office is approx-
imately 8 percent higher than what we would expect from a competitive state with
similar characteristics. They argue that insurance commissioners use their position
to gain favor with the industry presumably in return for political support during
future campaigns. So they tend to argue that the claim that the selection mech-
anism motivates commissioners is inconsistent with the results of Besley & Coate
(2000). However they do find evidence that Insurance Commissioners who happen to
be consumer advocates are successful in reducing the price of insurance.
Fields, Klein & Sfiridis (1997) found evidence that the passage of Proposition
103 significantly reduced the value of life insurers doing business in California. Propo-
sition 103 among other things, established a statewide, elected, position of Insurance
Commissioner beginning November 1990.
1.2 Background Information
Insurance has historically been and continues to be subject to state regula-
tion with little intervention from the federal government 9. McCarren-Fergusson Act
(1945) exempts insurance from anti-trust federal regulation which makes the state
regulations and state regulators the key force driving policy outcomes.
State legislatures set broad policy for the regulation of insurance by enact-
ing legislation providing regulatory framework under which insurance commissioners
operate. They set tax rates and establish laws which grant regulatory authority to
commissioners and oversee state insurance departments and approve regulatory bud-
9In the Paul vs Virginia case (1869) Supreme Court ruled that insurance would be subject to state
regulation, beyond the legislative reach of US Congress. In 1944, the Supreme Court overturned
the Paul vs Virginia (1869) case. However, the Congress responded by enacting the McCarren-
Fergusson Act in 1945 which exempted insurance industry from anti-trust regulations and reinforced
the authority of the states on insurance.
10
gets. Some of the key functions of the insurance commissioners as heads of insurance
departments of their respective states are insurer licensing, producer licensing, prod-
uct regulation, market conduct, financial regulation and consumer services. There is
inter-state and inter-temporal heterogeneity in the regulatory powers and functions of
an insurance commissioner. Some of these powers and functions are briefly discussed
in the next sub-section.
1.2.1 Functions and regulatory powers of an Insurance Com-
missioner
1.2.1.1 Product Regulation and Rate Regulation
All states equip an insurance commissioner with the power to regulate auto-
mobile insurance premiums. This regulatory power varies from state to state. This
regulatory power is classified into five categories.
Prior Approval On one extreme is the prior approval system. In states with such
a system, an insurance firm needs to take prior approval from the Office of Insurance
Commissioner (OIC) before they can change policies. According to NAIC, there are
17 states which have a prior approval rate regulation system.
Flexible Rating Some states have flexible rating system, where insurance firms are
allowed to change premiums on a policy within a range in an year and need approval
from the OIC if they intend to change their premiums beyond those limits. According
to NAIC, four states have a flexible rating system
File and Use Some states have File and Use system, where an insurance firm needs
to file an application with the OIC to change the premium it charges on a particular
11
automobile insurance policy. After filing, the firm can switch to new premiums and
continue to use them unless OIC objects to the change. According to NAIC, twenty
states have file and use system.
Use and File Some states have Use and File system, where insurance firms can
start using the new premiums they want to charge on a policy and inform the OIC
of this change within a stipulated time period (usually three months). According to
NAIC, nine states have a use and file system.
No File Only Wyoming has a no file system, where insurance firms are not required
to seek any kind of approval from OIC to change premiums charged on a policy.
However an insurance firm must supply evidence that necessitated a rate change if
requested by the commissioner.
However, in a few states, there could be different rating system for different
parts of the auto policy. The insurance firms have to seek approval to change the
premium relating to only specific components of an insurance policy. Some of these
parts could be bodily injury liability coverage, protection from uninsured motorists,
changing rates in different geographical regions etc. For example, in Connecticut,
there is a Prior Approval rate regulation for body injury coverage and on coverage
for protection from uninsured motorists. However, there is a File and Use system
for property damage liability coverage for both comprehensive and collision parts of
the policy. Besides, there is a flexible rating system of +/- 6 percent and not more
than a 15 percent increase in any individual territory. Another state, New Hampshire
generally follows a File and Use system but switches to Prior Approval system for
those sections of the market which the commissioner deems non-competitive. For
purposes of analysis in this paper, I have used the generally prevalent rate regulation
12
system.
In 2010, over 565,000 filings were processed through the System for Elec-
tronic Rate and Form Fillings across the country. National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) notes that even in states with competitive rating approach,
regulators typically retain authority to disapprove rates if they think that competi-
tion is not working10. Commissioners can also make changes in the insurance policy
provisions if they deem them to be unreasonable and unfair as per state law.
1.2.1.2 Insurer Licensing
State laws require insurers and insurance-related businesses to be licensed
before selling their products. All U.S. insurers are subject to regulation in their state
of domicile and in the other states where they are licensed to sell insurance. Insurers
who fail to comply with regulatory requirements are subject to license suspension or
revocation, and states may exact fines for regulatory violations. In 2010, there were
342 companies that had their licenses suspended or revoked. Thus, commissioners
can use insurer licensing as a potential threat to make companies fall in line.
1.2.1.3 Financial Regulation
State financial examiners investigate an insurers accounting methods, proce-
dures and financial statement presentation. These exams verify and validate what
is presented in the insurers annual statement to ascertain whether the insurer is in
sound financial standing. When an examination of financial records shows the com-
pany to be financially impaired, the state insurance department takes control of the
insurer.
10Rates for life insurance and annuity products generally are not subject to regulatory approval, al-
though Commissioners may seek to ensure that policy benefits are commensurate with the premiums
charged.
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1.2.1.4 Market Regulation
Traditional market conduct examinations review producer licensing issues,
complaints, types of products sold by insurers and producers, producer sales practices,
compliance with filed rating plans, claims handling and other market-related aspects
of an insurers operation. When violations are found, the insurance department makes
recommendations to improve the insurers operations and to bring the company into
compliance with state law. In addition, an insurer or insurance producer may be
subject to civil penalties or license suspension or revocation.
1.2.1.5 Producer Licensing
This refers to licensing of insurance agents and brokers. Currently 2 million
individuals are licensed to provide insurance services in US. Producers who fail to
comply with regulatory requirements are subject to fines and license suspension or
revocation. In 2010, roughly 5,000 agents and brokers had their licenses suspended
or revoked. Fines exceeded $25 million and over $50 million was returned to rightful
owners.
1.2.1.6 Insurance Premium Sales Tax Revenue
In about 35 states, Departments of Insurance are directly responsible for ad-
ministration and collection of Insurance Premium Sales Tax Revenues. These tax
rates are determined by the state legislatures and vary by lines of business. These
taxes are levied on direct premiums written. These are in addition to other corporate
taxes that the industry has to pay which are usually collected by other state/federal
agencies.
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1.2.2 Selection mechanism of the Insurance Commissioner
In 11 states, insurance commissioners are selected through election (by ballot).
These are California and Washington on the west; North Dakota and Montana in
the north; Kansas and Oklahoma in the center; Louisiana and Mississippi in the
south; Delaware, North Carolina, and Georgia in the east. In Virginia, the insurance
commissioner is appointed by a 3 member Virginia State Corporation Commission11
which in turn are elected by the General Assembly. In New Mexico, the commissioner
is appointed by a 5 member elected board12. In remaining states and Washington D.C,
an insurance commissioner is selected through appointment by Governor and serves
at Governor’s pleasure. Previous literature has treated Virginia and New Mexico as
having an appointed commissioner and I continue with this practice in this paper.
1.2.2.1 Endogeneity issues with selection of Insurance Commissioners
This section explores whether the selection mechanism of insurance commis-
sioners is endogenous. Does higher premiums on auto insurance premiums induce
a switch from an appointed to elected position. I discuss recent cases where states
have made a switch from one selection method to another. I also discuss the political
orientation of these states. In 2014, of the 11 insurance commissioners who were pub-
licly elected to office, 6 were Republicans and 5 were Democrats. In the 37 states that
authorized to appoint insurance commissioners, 17 were appointed by Democrats and
19 were appointed by Republicans.
I have collected information on when was the Office of Insurance Commis-
11The commission is responsible for handling all charters ”of domestic corporations and all licenses
of foreign corporations to do business” within the commonwealth.
12New Mexico Public Regulation Commission is responsible for regulation of public utilities, trans-
portation companies, transmission and pipeline companies, insurance companies and other public
companies.
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sioner / Division of Insurance established in each state. Wherever possible, I have
gathered information on who was regulating the insurance industry before such an
office/division was established. I also collect information on whether these states
switched their selection mechanism (from elected to appointed position or vice-versa).
The source of this information is the state constitutions, state insurance offices and
general information available on the internet.
In most of the states, by the turn of the twentieth century, an Office of Insur-
ance Commissioner was in place. Since 1960, switches from an elected to appointed
Insurance Commissioner have happened in only three states (Louisiana, California
and Florida). Louisiana and California switched in 1960 and 1989 respectively from
an appointed to an elected position. Florida has moved from an elected to appointed
commissioner in 2003-04.
Other states have not switched since the regulatory body was established,
despite changes in economic and political environment. Hunter et al.(2013)13 notes
that “Over the past quarter century, auto insurance expenditures in America have
risen by more than 40 percent. Consumers in some states are paying 80 percent,
90 percent, and even 100 percent more for auto insurance than they paid in 1989.”
However we see none of the states switch from an appointed to elected position to
force lower rates.
Table 1.1 provides information on when were these Office of Insurance Com-
missioners established, and in which year they switched (I have provided information
on 35 states). The next section discusses the recent cases where states switched.
13What Works: A Review of Auto Insurance Rate Regulation in America and How Best Practices
Save Billions of Dollars.
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1.2.2.2 Cases where selection mechanism were changed
California switched from having an appointed insurance commissioner to having
an elected insurance commissioner as a result of Proposition 103 in 1988 which was
narrowly passed with the approval of 51 percent of the voters (4,844,312). Proposi-
tion 103 was a response to a 1984 law that required California drivers to have auto
insurance. There were various provisions of Proposition 103. It required insurance
companies to reduce rates for motor vehicle, fire and liability insurance by about 20
percent from 1987 levels and a rate freeze till 1989. It also required the commissioner
to approve rate increases before they could take effect and change the Office of Insur-
ance Commissioner from an appointed to an elected position. Characteristics as the
drivers place of residence, age, sex, and marital status could no longer be used without
the approval of the Commissioner. These factors were frequently used by insurance
companies prior to the passage of Proposition 103 (Jaffee & Russell (1998)). Jaffee &
Russell (1998) report a significant and positive relationship by county between higher
insurance premiums and a yes vote on Proposition 103.
Florida switched from an having an elected insurance commissioner to an appointed
insurance commissioner with the passage of Florida Restructuring the State Cabinet
Amendment approved on the ballot on November 3, 1998. Fifty-five percent of votes
were polled in favor of the Amendment. This amendment merged the cabinet offices of
treasurer and comptroller into one chief financial officer; reduces cabinet membership
to the chief financial officer, attorney general, agriculture commissioner; secretary
of state and education commissioner eliminated from elected cabinet; changed the
composition of State Board of Education comprising of the governor and the cabinet
to a board appointed by the governor; this board would now appoint the education
commissioner; defined the state board of administration, trustees of internal improve-
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ment trust fund, land acquisition trust fund. So in Florida, a switch from an elected
to appointed position was not related to insurance premiums but a result of the
restructuring of the state cabinet.
In the case of California, prices do seem to have motivated voters decision to
support Proposition 103. However, states with higher or similar average expenditures
like New Jersey, Connecticut or D.C. didnot switch from an appointed to an elected
position. In Florida, the switch was part of a large scale restructuring of state cabinet.
Other states have not switched despite dramatic changes in economic and political
environments so I claim that selection mechanism of an insurance commissioner is
exogenous.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Urban and Rural Counties For electing an insurance commissioner, states follow
a statewide simple majority electoral system. In such a system, a candidate who
gets the most number of votes wins the election. The elections for the position of
an insurance commissioner are generally bi-partisan fights between Republican and
Democratic candidates where the candidate with more than 50 percent of the votes
polled is the winner. An elected commissioner will use be most prominent in those
areas where most of the population is concentrated. About 50 percent of the US
population is concentrated in 10 percent of its counties. Hence, for an insurance
commissioner such areas with heavy concentration of population becomes critical for
electoral outcomes.
Therefore, I have classified counties as urban and rural based on the pop-
ulation living in those counties. I rank all the counties within a state in terms of
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population with the highest rank assigned to the county having the highest popula-
tion. I then select those highest ranked counties which contain 50 percent of state’s
population. I label these counties as urban counties. All other counties are labeled
as rural. Therefore, I classify 307 counties as urban and 2740 counties as rural. On
an average, about 50 percent of a state’s population is located in about 10 percent
of its counties. For example, Georgia has 159 counties but 50 percent of Georgia’s
population is concentrated in 16 counties. Hence, based on this classification, Geor-
gia has 16 urban counties and 143 rural counties. Counties in most states are fairly
similar in terms of their geographical areas14. Hence most of the urban counties are
also generally the most densely populated counties in a state.
Quotes on auto insurance premiums Previous studies on automobile insurance
regulation used unit price of insurance (the ratio of premium revenue received to
losses incurred by the insurer) as a measure of average price paid by insureds per
dollar of benefits (loss payments) received. These aggregates are usually at the state
level. Data on insurance premiums at the level of an individual is not available
because it would reveal the pricing strategies of those firms who disclose their prices
to their competitors. However, recent innovations in website development has enabled
insurance firms to reach out to potential consumers by providing them quotes on
their desired insurance policy online. These websites allow consumers to get accurate
quotes after taking into account various characteristics of the individual driver and
car. Almost all major automobile insurance firms maintain such websites. A consumer
can get a quote for his desired policy from various firms through their websites. Hence,
firms use these websites to provide quotes which are competitively priced to attract
consumers.
14California is an exception.
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For this paper, I scrapped a website maintained by a major automobile insur-
ance firm to get quotes on various insurance policies covering 48 counties and 3039
counties. Since it takes about 1.5 minutes to collect one quote, the entire data col-
lection process took 3 months. I collected data from February 2015 to April 2015.
In most states, automobile insurance premiums vary by zip-codes. There are about
40,000 zip-codes in the United States. It was not possible to collect quotes for all the
zip-codes because of time and legal constraints. Hence for this paper, I have selected
one zip-code from each county. This zip-code has the highest resident population in
comparison to other zip-codes located in the county. All counties in 48 states are in-
cluded in the study. For some counties, data on accident rates is not available. Hence,
I have dropped these counties. The study does not include Montana, Wyoming and
Alaska because of legal constraints on data collection imposed by the firm whose
website was being used to collect data.
The basic models in the existing literature suggest that politicians respond
to the preferences of the median voter. Hence, for this paper, I collect quotes on
automobile insurance policy preferred by a hypothetical individual who represents
the median voter in the United States. The hypothetical individual is a 50 years
old male (primary driver) living with his wife who is 48 years old and registered as
a secondary driver on the policy. Various sources in the industry suggest that for
drivers in the age group of 25 years to 65 years, age of the driver does not affect
premiums. I also assume that the primary and the secondary drivers have a clean
driving record15 and they stay in a house they ‘own’16.
I also assume that the median voter drives Toyota Corolla. This is a realistic
15This is because driver who care about premiums drive safely. Also it simplifies the data collection
process.
16People who live in the houses they own are more likely to be the resident of the state and hence
potential voters.
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assumption because Toyota Corolla is a relatively inexpensive car (its market price
is about $17000). The cost of maintaining a Toyota Corolla is known to be lower in
comparison to other cars. Besides, it can be used for a long period of time. Hence it
is in the affordable range of the American middle class and ranks second among the
best selling cars in the United States. I also assume that expected annual mileage
of the car is about 12,000 miles which is in accordance with the average miles per
vehicle reported by the Federal Highway Administration17. I have labeled this quote
as the median voter quote. For a detailed questionnaire, please see the Appendix.
However, even a median voter in different parts of the country would choose a
different insurance policy based on the local conditions. Hence, comparing quotes for a
hypothetical individual as he moves to different counties would essentially mean com-
paring two different products. Hence, I have also collected quotes on a standard auto-
mobile insurance policy where I keep the liability coverage and deductibles constant.
I have labeled these quotes as constant coverage quote. In other words,constant
coverage quote represents the the price of a similar product (automobile insurance
policy) across different counties (for a hypothetical individual). In some states, state
regulations make it mandatory for the firms to sell additional coverage like Personal
Injury Protection etc. However, attention has been paid to keep the coverage constant
as much as possible.
Various drivers are only interested in getting the minimum liability coverage
on their insurance policy to escape high automobile insurance premiums. For such
drivers looking for cheapest possible options, auto insurance premiums are likely
to be a salient issue when it comes to electing insurance commissioners. Hence, it is
interesting to examine whether selection mechanism of an insurance commissioner will
17The exact estimates provided by the Federal Highway Administration is 11,244 average miles
per vehicle in the year 2013.
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have an impact on the premiums on an auto insurance policy which offers minimum
mandatory liability coverage as per state laws. This mandatory minimum coverage
is different in different states. Hence, I have collected quotes on insurance policies
which offers mandatory minimum coverage to the policyholder. I have labeled them
as minimum quote.
It is also worth examining whether the elected insurance commissioner caters
to the rich driver. This is because elected commissioners could theoretically subsidize
median voters at the expense of the rich voters as suggested by Director’s Law. Hence,
I have collected quotes on auto insurance policies which are likely to be purchased by
rich drivers. A rich driver is assumed to be a hypothetical individual (similar to the
median voter) who drives Mercedes C Matic 350. This is an expensive car which sells
for about $45000 and is likely to be purchased by individuals with high disposable
incomes. I have labeled these quotes as rich driver quotes.
Other data sources The data on zip code wise population is available from zip-
codes.com. This website is also the source of data on average income per household,
proportion of black people living in a zip-code and the elevation of the zip code from
the sea level. Analysts working in auto insurance firms suggest that rich drivers tend
to pay out of pocket in case of an accident. This helps them to avoid paying higher
auto insurance premiums in the future. Poor people tend to have financial constraints
and are more likely to file a claim in case of an accident. Hence, I have added average
income per household in a zip code as a control. I also add proportion of black
people as a control because this measure is correlated with various neighborhood
characteristics like crime rates, theft rates, etc. I have also added elevation from the
sea level as a control because low lying areas are prone to flooding risks and increases
the premium on automobile insurance.
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Motor vehicle crashes or accidents are an important factor that determines
auto insurance premiums. Data on the number of motor vehicle accidents that hap-
pened in 2013 in a county are available from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). Most appropriate data should have been for the year 2014
which are not yet available. However, data from 2013 can be useful if we assume
correlation in accidents in a city across years. This data is available at the level of
the city. This is the most reliable data set on accident rates available for the purpose
of this study. For 59 counties in the sample, the data on the number of accidents
was not available and hence those counties were dropped from the analysis. So, the
effectively covers 48 states and 2681 counties.
Information on whether the state has an elected or appointed Insurance Com-
missioner is available from National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
NAIC publishes an annual report, the Auto Insurance Database Report. This report
provides information on status of rate regulation in a state. Based on this information
on rate regulation, states have been classified into 5 categories as discussed in Section
3. Auto Insurance Database Report also provides information on value of automobile
insurance policies sold (or the auto insurance premiums written) providing liability
coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage. The report provides infor-
mation on the number of claims made on auto insurance policies written to provide
liability coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage. The report also
provides information on the payments made by the industry on the claims filed on
policies providing liability coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage.
This report also provide data on number of motor vehicle accidents per 1000 regis-
tered vehicles and the number of motor vehicle thefts per 100000 registered vehicles.
This report also provides information on the number of registered vehicles in a state
in a year. All this information is available at the state level for the years 2007 to 2011
23
for all states except Texas. Historical data on Gross Domestic Product (state-wise)
for all states and regions in the United States is available at Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA).
Table 1.2, Table 1.12 provides summary statistics for various variables used.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of variables used in the analysis of premiums
at the individual level. Table 1.12 provides summary statistics for variables used in
examining the premium per vehicle at the state level. The tables show that premiums
in urban counties are higher as compared to premiums in rural counties. This is
because accidents and population density are much higher in urban counties than
in rural counties. Also, standard deviation in premiums is much higher for urban
counties as compared to rural counties providing some preliminary evidence of higher
cross subsidization in urban counties as compared to rural counties.
Table 1.3 provides a difference of means t-test for urban counties in states
with elected commissioners vs urban counties in states with appointed commissioners.
The results show that premiums in urban counties are lower in states with an elected
commissioner. This difference is statistically significant. ’Number of accidents’ and
’population’ (living in the zip-code) are not significantly different in states with elected
and appointed regulators. Urban counties in states with elected commissioners tend
to have lower average income per household and are in low lying areas (which increases
the risks of flooding). Proportion of black population too is significantly higher in
urban counties located in states with elected commissioners. Low elevation levels and
high proportion of black population are associated with higher premiums. However,
the table shows that the difference in premiums is significant even without controlling
for these factors. Income levels are associated with lower premiums, but the difference
in income is not large enough to warrant the difference in premiums. It should also
be noted that income of an individual have already been taken in to account while
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collecting the data. This is because a lot of variables which were used in collecting
data (e.g. type of car owned, ownership of house etc.) are correlated with the income
of an individual.
1.4 Econometric Specification
The key variable of interest, the selection mechanism of the insurance commis-
sioner is a dummy variable. However, during the period of analysis, this variable does
not change. Hence it is not possible to use a fixed effects model. I have presented my
results on the individual level data using a simple OLS estimation method. However
for the state level analysis over a 5 year period, I have presented my results using
a random effects model as well as a simple OLS model with errors being clustered
at the state level. The random effects model allows for un-observable time invariant
heterogeneity at the state level which is uncorrelated with other variables.
1.4.1 Determinants of Auto Insurance Premiums: individual
level data set
I use OLS regression procedure to estimate the affect of mode of selection
of an insurance commissioner on the monthly auto insurance premiums paid by the
consumers. These results are clustered at the state level. The results are arrived at,
after controlling for factors which might impact the car insurance premiums. Some
of these are the accident rates in the county, elevation of the zip-code from the sea
level (low lying areas pose increased risks to property because of flooding), average
household incomes and rate regulation in the state. Various driver specific and car
specific characteristics like driving history, age, income level, marital status, etc have
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been controlled while collecting data.
I use the following econometric specification to estimate the determinants of
quote for the policy preferred by the median voter, policy offering minimum coverage,
policy offering constant coverage across states and counties and the policies purchased
by the rich voter.
Quotei = α0+α1Appointedi+α2Prior Approvali+α3FlexibleRatingi+α3Elevationi
+α5Incomei+α6Motor V ehicleAccidentsi+α7Prop. of Black Populationi+yi+ei
(1.1)
where Quote is the One month car Insurance Premium in zip-code i; Appointed
is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the insurance commissioner is ap-
pointed in the state in which zip-code i is located, 0 otherwise; PriorApproval is the
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state has a prior approval rate regula-
tion system, 0 otherwise; FlexibleRating is the dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if the state has a flexible rating rate regulation system, 0 otherwise; Elevation is
the altitude of the zip code from the sea level measured in feet; Income is the average
income of the households living in zip-code i; MotorV ehicleAccidents is the number
of accidents in the county in which zip-code i is located; Prop.ofBlackPopulation
is the proportion of population who identify themselves as black in zip-code i; y
represent year dummies; e is the error term.
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1.4.2 Determinants of Auto Insurance Premiums per regis-
tered vehicle: state level data
To estimate the differential impact of appointed vs elected regulators on the
premiums paid per capita, I have used the random effects model and the following
econometric specification. I have also shown results using the OLS specification. The
results are clustered at the state level. The regression analysis uses data from the
year 2007 to 2011.
Premiumper vehiclest = α0 + α1Appointedst + α2Prior Approvalst
+α3FlexibleRatingst+α4AccidentRatest+α5Theft ratest+α6GDPpercapitast+α7GDPst
+ α8Populationst + yi + est (1.2)
where, Premiumper vehicle is the amount of auto insurance premiums per
registered vehicle written in a state; Appointed is the dummy variable which takes
the value of 1 if the insurance commissioner is appointed in the state in which zip-
code i is located, 0 otherwise; Prior Approval is the dummy variable which takes
the value of 1 if the state has a prior approval rate regulation system, 0 otherwise;
FlexibleRating is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state has
a flexible rating rate regulation system, 0 otherwise; AccidentRate is the number
of accidents per 1000 registered vehicles in the state as reported by Auto Insurance
Database Report; Theft rate is the number of motor vehicle thefts in the state per
100,000 registered vehicles; y is the year dummies; e is the error term. s and t are
state and year subscripts.
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1.4.3 Determinants of auto damage claims paid out on auto
insurance policies
To estimate the determinants of claims paid out on the auto insurance policies,
I estimate the following equation using the random effects model. I also show the
results using the OLS specification. The results are clustered at the state level and
uses data from the year 2007 to 2011.
Payments = α0 + α1(Premiums)st + α2(No. of Claims)st+
α3(Appointed) ∗ (No. of Claims)st + α4Prior Approval ∗ (No. of Claims)st+
α5FlexibleRating ∗ (No. of Claims)st + α6(GDP )st + α7(Population)st + yi + est
(1.3)
where Payments is the total amount of dollars paid out by the insurance
industry on auto insurance policies; Premiums have three components: Premi-
ums on Liability Coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage respec-
tively. Liability Coverage Premiums is the premiums (in $ ) sold by the industry
on the liability coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state;
CollisionCovrage Premiums is the premiums (in $ ) sold by the industry on the
collision coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state in a year;
ComprehensiveCoverage Premium is the premiums (in $ ) sold by the industry on
the comprehensive coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state;
No. of claims is the number of claims filed by consumers on auto insurance policies
in a state in a year; Appointed is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
the insurance commissioner is appointed in the state in which zip-code i is located,
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0 otherwise; ;Prior Approval is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
the state has a prior approval rate regulation system, 0 otherwise; FlexibleRating is
the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state has a flexible rating rate
regulation system, 0 otherwise; y represent year dummies; e is the error term. s and
t are state and year subscripts.
1.5 Results and Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide conclusive evidence that selection mechanism of an
insurance commissioner has a causal impact on auto insurance premiums. Compared
to states with an appointed commissioner, states with an elected commissioner have
lower auto insurance premiums in the counties where a majority of state’s population
is concentrated.
It is critical for an elected commissioner to offer policies which are salient
for most voters as well as provide incentive to the industry to make contributions
for his electoral campaign. The insurance industry is the only major source of cam-
paign contributions for an insurance commissioner. In a simple majority election,
with generally two candidates in the electoral fray, the best strategy for an elected
commissioner is to use the limited funds at his disposal to reach out to most voters.
Therefore, a commissioner seems to pay greater attention to the counties where a
majority of state’s population is concentrated. On an average, in the United States,
50 percent population of a state is concentrated in only 10 percent of the counties.
Hence, an elected commissioner prefers lower premiums in the most populous counties
(as compared to appointed commissioners).
After controlling for a variety of factors like accident rates, theft rates, regu-
latory powers that a commissioner in a state has to control premiums, I find evidence
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that in urban counties (or counties where a majority of state’s population is con-
centrated), an elected commissioner leads to lower premiums. For urban counties, a
median voter living in a state with an elected commissioner pays about $50 less on
monthly automobile insurance premium as compared to a median voter living in a
state with an appointed commissioner. A policy providing minimum coverage costs
$42 less per month in an urban county in a state with an elected commissioner. Sim-
ilarly, a policy providing similar coverage is about $42 less per month in a state with
an elected commissioner. A comparison across urban counties reveal that even rich
voters have to pay about $53 less per month on an auto insurance policy in a state
with an elected commissioner.
The regulatory powers of insurance commissioners vary across states. For
example, the power to regulate premium on an automobile insurance policy varies
from state to state. Various states have a prior approval rate regulation system. In
these states, an insurance firm need to take prior approval from the Office of Insurance
Commissioner (OIC) to change the premiums on auto insurance policies. Some states
have a flexible rating system of rate regulation where an insurance firm does not need
to get approval from OIC if they want to change premiums within a fixed range. On
the other extreme is Wyoming where the commissioner has very limited power to
regulate premiums.
Theoretically, the impact of rate regulation is ambiguous. The premiums
charged by the firms on insurance policies in a state would be a function of the
preferences of the regulator as well as his/her power to regulate premiums. Merely
having greater regulatory powers does not imply that a regulator would favor lower
premiums. Before Proposition 103, the state insurance commissioner in California had
the duty to ensure that insurance rates were neither excessive nor inadequate, but
as noted by Sugarman (1990), this price control authority was rarely used. Besides,
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premiums would be sticky in an environment where it is costly to change premiums
which might cause an upward bias on premiums. In this paper, I find evidence which
suggests that higher power to regulate premium is associated with higher premiums
in urban counties. However, this association is generally not statistically significant.
Empirically, rate regulation seems to have no impact on sparsely populated areas. It
generally seems to be the case that regulators, whether elected or appointed, tend to
pay greater attention to the concerns of the voters located in urban counties.
I have also added a variable to control for the elevation of the zip code from the
sea level. This is because low lying areas are prone to flooding and hence greater risks
to properties in general. As expected, I found that there is a negative relationship
between risks from flooding and auto insurance premiums. In the individual level
analysis, number of accidents seems to have no impact on auto insurance premiums.
This is partly because while collecting the data, I have already taken into account the
driving experiences of the policyholder. However in the state level analysis, higher
accident rate does seem to be associated with higher premium per vehicle.
I have also added “proportion of black people” in a neighborhood to control
for neighborhood characteristics. For example, a large number of black people are
poor and hence they would be forced to live in neighborhoods which have higher
crime rates and therefore drive down rental costs in that neighborhood. The results
seem to suggest that neighborhoods with higher proportion of black population are
associated with higher premiums. Motor vehicle thefts too have a positive impact on
auto insurance premiums. I was not able to use theft rates for the individual level
analysis because data on theft rates18 is not available for a large number of counties.
However, I do control for theft rates at the state level. I find evidence that higher
theft rates are associated with higher premiums.
18Available at Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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State level data also throws some interesting observations. The bulk of revenue
of the auto insurance industry comes from selling liability coverage which is manda-
tory in most states. About 65 percent of total premiums written by auto insurance
industry comes from writing liability coverage, 23 percent comes from collision cov-
erage and only 12 percent comes from comprehensive coverage. I use both random
effects model and simple ordinary least squares method to show that premium per
vehicle is significantly lower in states with elected commissioners for liability and col-
lision coverage. An elected commissioner makes a difference of about $90 per annum
on premium per vehicle for liability coverage $30 per annum on premium per vehicle
for collision coverage.
However, selection mechanism of the commissioner seems to have no impact
on premium per vehicle for comprehensive coverage. This anomaly can be explained
by the fact that most people do not care about comprehensive coverage. This is
evident from the amount of revenue earned on account of comprehensive coverage by
the industry. Hence, it is not electorally rewarding for the commissioner to regulate
premiums on comprehensive coverage.
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Questionnaire
This annexure provides detailed web-form that was filled to generate quotes
for auto insurance premiums. There was a slight variation across states on the the
questions asked to generate a quote.
Car Information
– Year 2014
– Make Toyota \Mercedes
– Model Corolla \C MATIC 350
– Primary Use Commuting to Work/School
– What is your estimated annual mileage? 10,000 - 15,000
– What is the ownership status? Financed (for Toyota) \Paid (for Mercedes)
– Did you purchase the car when it was new? Yes
– How many years have you owned/leased this vehicle? Less than one
year
– Do you want to add another vehicle? No
Driver Information
– Name ...........
– Gender Male
– Marital Status Married
– Date of Birth 03 - 05 - 1964
– When you got your first drivers license, how old were you? 21
– Email address fakeemail@ex.com
– Do you currently have car insurance No
– How long had it been since you had your car insurance 30 days or
less
– Has this driver had any major violations in the last 5 years? No
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– Accidents or minor violations in the last 3 years No
– Other auto damage claims in the last 3 years No
– Street Address 385 Fake Circle 3
– City (the city in which the zip code is located)
– State (the state in which the zip code is located)
– Zipcode (varies with each observation)
– Primary Residence Own Home
– Education Bachelor’s Degree
Spouse Information
– Name ...........
– Would you like to include your spouse on this policy Yes, additional
driver on policy
– Gender Female
– Date of Birth 04 - 02 - 1966
– When you got your first drivers license, how old were you? 21
– Has this driver had any major violations in the last 5 years? No
– Accidents or minor violations in the last 3 years No
– Other auto damage claims in the last 3 years No
Car Insurance History
– What was your most recent insurance company Allstate Insurance
– When did your policy end Less than one month
– When would you like your new policy to start In a week
– What were the body injury limits on your policy $50,000 - $100,000
– What were the deductibles on your policy $100
36
Table 1.1: Statwise Historical Information on Office of
Insurance Commissioners
Estd. Year Note
(1) (2) (3)
Arizona 1969 None Before 1969, Arizona State
Commission regulated the
industry
Arkansas 1917 None
Colorado 1879 None
Connecticut 1865 None
Washington 1889 1907 Initially part of Secretary of
State’s office. Main func-
tion was to register insurers
doing business
Rhode Island 1939 None Department of Business
Regulation established in
1939
Oregon 1887 None
New Hampshire 1851 None
Kansas 1871 1900 Switched from appointed to
elected in year 1900
South Dakota 1897 None
Wisconsin 1870 1881, 1911 Secretary of State was Com-
missioner of Insurance till
1878. Position of Commis-
sioner was made elective in
1881 and made appointive
again in 1911. It has since
remained an appointive po-
sition
North Dakota 1889 None
Pennsylvania 1873 None
Texas 1876 None
New Mexico NA None
Maine 1870 None
Alabama 1897 None
Virginia 1906 None
Florida 1848 1966, 2003 In 1966, Office switched to ap-
pointed position. In 2003,
switched back to appointed
Maryland 1872 None
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North Carolina 1899 Yes The first Commissioner of insur-
ance was first elected by General
Assembly and then appointed by
Governor. In 1907, the posi-
tion was made elected and hasn’t
changed since
Kentucky 1870 None The department was established
as a bureau in Auditor’s office in
1870. In 1934, department was
designated as a separate identity
Wyoming 1919 None
Louisiana 1921 1960 State Constitution was amended
in 1958 by Acts 1958, No. 125 to
create Office of Insurance Com-
missioner. The position was ap-
pointed until 1960. It has been
elected since then
Montana 1889 None
Oklahoma 1907 None
Missouri 1872 NA
Vermont 1923 None From 1923 to 1939, Office was
part of the department of Insur-
ance. In 1939, an independant
Department of Banking and Fi-
nance was created. In 2012 the
name was changed to Department
of Finance Regulation
Nebraska 1913 None First complete insurance code en-
acted in 1913, provided for an in-
surance board to administer the
code. Before 1913, Territorial edi-
tor and later State Auditor issued
certificates to insurance compa-
nies and exercised powers in in-
vestigating and inspecting those
companies. The duties of insur-
ance board was given to bureau
of insurnace in the Department
of Trade and Commerce in 1919.
In 1933, bureau became Depart-
ment of Insurance. In 1947, leg-
islature passed laws that updated
the 1913 code.
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New Jersey atleast 1895 None
Indiana 1920 None
New York 1859 None
Illinois 1869 None
Idaho 1901 None
Massachusetts 1855 None
California 1868 1988 Proposition 103 (discussed in de-
tail in Section 5.1)
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Urban Counties
Quote (Median Voter) 159.9 84.4 47.5 652.5 307
Quote (Rich Voter) 163.2 84.3 53.2 516 307
Quote (Min. Coverage) 132.4 72.7 40.2 602.6 307
Quote (Const. Coverage) 155.9 79.3 49.7 467 307
Appointed 0.73 0.44 0 1 307
Prior approval 0.40 0.49 0 1 307
Flexible rating 0.12 0.33 0 1 307
Elevation 793.4 1064.2 0 6947 307
Income 54.7 17.2 24.5 123.0 307
No. of accidents 38.9 55.8 2 546 307
Prop. of black population 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.9 307
Rural Counties
Quote (Median Voter) 135.2 54.6 47.8 412.9 2681
Quote (Rich Voter) 140.7 52.9 56.8 490 2681
Quote (Min. Coverage) 111.6 41.7 37.5 331.2 2681
Quote (Const. Coverage) 134.4 53.2 49.31 444 2681
Appointed 0.76 0.43 0 1 2681
Prior approval 0.34 0.47 0 1 2681
Flexible rating 0.09 0.29 0 1 2681
Elevation 1189.9 1400.3 0 10190 2681
Income 43.9 12.6 13.9 126.9 2681
No. of accidents 6.6 8.9 0 121 2681
Prop. of black population 0.10 0.16 0 0.97 2681
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is ap-
pointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has
a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flex rating s a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto insurance regulation,
0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income (in thousands) is
the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is the number of motor
vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located; Proportion of black
population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
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Table 1.3: Difference of Means (t-test): Urban counties in states with Elected vs
Appointed regulators
Variable Mean Difference Std. Errors(Diff.) N
Quote (Median Voter) 160.9 -20.5∗∗ 10.8 307
Quote (Rich Voter) 164.2 -23.5∗∗ 10.9 307
Quote (Min. Coverage) 133.3 -16.61∗ 9.4 307
Quote (Const. Coverage) 155.9 -14.8∗∗ 10.3 307
Income 54,650 - 4,177∗∗ 2,214 307
No. of accidents 38.9 1.5 7.2 307
Elevation 793.4 -288.9∗ 137 307
Population 47,213 -822 2,260 307
Prop. of black population 0.16 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02 307
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Monthly Quote on automobile insurance policy preferred by the Median
Voter (Urban)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 23.98 44.76∗ 46.31∗ 46.43∗ 46.43∗ 45.32∗ 53.48∗∗
(18.84) (25.22) (24.19) (24.13) (24.13) (24.42) (26.25)
Prior approval 42.94∗ 36.57 36.44 36.44 34.30 30.58
(24.91) (24.01) (24.03) (24.03) (24.03) (23.85)
Flexible rating 93.98∗ 87.71∗ 87.40∗ 87.40∗ 88.19∗ 87.46∗
(52.21) (50.16) (50.21) (50.21) (49.30) (47.26)
Elevation -0.0169∗∗ -0.0170∗∗ -0.0170∗∗ -0.0163∗∗ -0.0125∗∗
(0.00736) (0.00742) (0.00742) (0.00725) (0.00607)
Income -0.0389 -0.0389 -0.0573 0.163
(0.290) (0.290) (0.285) (0.349)
No. of Accidents 0.171 0.166
(0.156) (0.133)
Proportion of
black population 92.43∗
(54.86)
cons 142.3∗∗∗ 98.06∗∗∗ 113.7∗∗∗ 115.9∗∗∗ 115.9∗∗∗ 111.2∗∗∗ 77.46∗
(10.96) (28.27) (27.18) (31.70) (31.70) (31.41) (41.85)
N 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
R2 0.016 0.144 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.201 0.234
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0
otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior approval
system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy variable which takes the value of
1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical
altitude of the zip code; Income (in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No.
of accidents is the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Monthly Quote on an automobile insurance pollicy providing Minimum
Coverage as mandated by state laws (Urban)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 20.07 34.02∗ 35.51∗ 35.34∗ 34.30∗ 42.75∗∗
(14.35) (19.57) (18.45) (18.44) (18.71) (20.15)
Prior approval 29.44 23.33 23.51 21.51 17.66
(20.22) (19.23) (19.19) (19.19) (18.92)
Flexible rating 73.07 67.06 67.48 68.22 67.46
(51.49) (49.26) (49.15) (47.90) (44.67)
Elevation -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗ -0.0116∗∗
(0.00599) (0.00599) (0.00578) (0.00448)
Income 0.0517 0.0346 0.262
(0.229) (0.224) (0.276)
No. of accidents 0.160 0.154
(0.129) (0.106)
Proportion of
black population 95.73∗∗
(46.24)
cons 117.7∗∗∗ 86.46∗∗∗ 101.5∗∗∗ 98.55∗∗∗ 94.19∗∗∗ 59.21∗
(5.927) (21.97) (20.55) (23.69) (23.49) (33.39)
N 307 307 307 307 307 307
R2 0.015 0.116 0.171 0.171 0.185 0.233
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Monthly Quote on an auto insurance policy providing Constant Liability
Coverage (Urban)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 14.69 33.94 35.19∗ 35.16∗ 34.94∗ 42.39∗
(17.06) (21.41) (20.78) (20.57) (20.81) (21.99)
Prior approval 38.79 33.33 33.36 32.91 29.28
(25.23) (25.20) (25.21) (25.21) (26.53)
Flexible rating 70.52∗∗ 65.10∗ 65.19∗∗ 65.36∗∗ 64.24∗
(32.27) (32.71) (32.22) (32.42) (34.01)
Elevation -0.0146∗ -0.0146∗ -0.0144∗ -0.0107∗
(0.00781) (0.00763) (0.00773) (0.00621)
Income 0.0110 0.00731 0.219
(0.336) (0.339) (0.467)
No. of accidents 0.0358 0.0286
(0.118) (0.102)
Proportion of
black population 96.28
(76.81)
cons 145.1∗∗∗ 106.5∗∗∗ 120.1∗∗∗ 119.5∗∗∗ 118.5∗∗∗ 85.49∗∗
(8.425) (26.47) (27.79) (32.26) (31.92) (41.63)
N 307 307 307 307 307 307
R2 0.007 0.096 0.133 0.133 0.134 0.172
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Monthly quote on an autombile insurance policy brought by a Rich Voter
(Urban)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 26.80 44.51∗∗ 45.79∗∗ 45.73∗∗ 45.73∗∗ 53.46∗∗
(17.27) (21.81) (21.63) (21.36) (21.65) (23.55)
Prior approval 35.82 30.26 30.32 30.30 26.52
(26.58) (26.99) (27.02) (27.10) (28.82)
Flexible rating 67.07∗∗ 61.56∗∗ 61.72∗∗ 61.72∗∗ 60.55∗
(30.42) (30.55) (30.03) (30.20) (30.30)
Elevation -0.0149∗ -0.0148∗ -0.0148∗ -0.0109∗
(0.00819) (0.00794) (0.00812) (0.00639)
Income 0.0192 0.0190 0.238
(0.367) (0.371) (0.518)
No. of accidents 0.00143 -0.00603
(0.114) (0.0968)
Proportion of
black population 99.96
(87.33)
cons 143.4∗∗∗ 107.6∗∗∗ 121.4∗∗∗ 120.3∗∗∗ 120.2∗∗∗ 86.00∗
(8.650) (27.49) (29.41) (34.11) (33.77) (45.51)
N 307 307 307 307 307 307
R2 0.019 0.090 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.160
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located ;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Monthly Quote on automobile insurance policy preferred by the Median
Voter (Rural)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 11.29 17.24 17.90 18.02 16.61 17.46
(15.33) (17.29) (16.90) (16.92) (16.80) (16.83)
Prior approval 2.887 0.408 0.00754 -4.909 -5.876
(18.79) (19.17) (19.14) (19.21) (19.41)
Flexible rating 56.36 55.05 54.28 53.69 53.74
(39.12) (38.00) (37.29) (37.36) (37.72)
Elevation -0.00540∗ -0.00535∗ -0.00485∗ -0.00442
(0.00284) (0.00283) (0.00273) (0.00279)
Income -0.154 -0.277 -0.234
(0.275) (0.274) (0.312)
No. of accidents 0.921∗ 0.904∗
(0.532) (0.521)
Proportion of
black population 15.19
(32.28)
cons 126.6∗∗∗ 116.1∗∗∗ 123.0∗∗∗ 129.8∗∗∗ 132.1∗∗∗ 128.0∗∗∗
(8.413) (20.52) (21.30) (22.52) (22.28) (24.65)
N 2681 2681 2681 2731 2681 2681
R2 0.008 0.089 0.108 0.109 0.130 0.132
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
46
Table 1.9: Monthly Quote on an automobile insurance pollicy providing Minimum
Coverage as mandated by state laws (Rural)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 5.773 5.381 6.132 6.135 5.063 6.137
(11.49) (10.90) (10.55) (10.55) (10.45) (10.17)
Prior approval -4.066 -6.220 -6.480 -10.42 -11.96
(14.59) (14.89) (14.99) (15.04) (15.08)
Flexible rating 24.05 22.86 22.47 22.06 22.05
(19.22) (18.17) (18.09) (17.92) (18.10)
Elevation -0.00500∗∗ -0.00498∗∗ -0.00458∗∗ -0.00398∗
(0.00205) (0.00204) (0.00199) (0.00210)
Income -0.0752 -0.174 -0.115
(0.215) (0.219) (0.243)
No. of accidents 0.748∗ 0.729∗
(0.409) (0.394)
Proportion of
black population 21.16
(20.21)
cons 107.2∗∗∗ 106.6∗∗∗ 112.9∗∗∗ 116.3∗∗∗ 118.0∗∗∗ 112.4∗∗∗
(5.617) (14.01) (14.87) (18.27) (18.34) (19.61)
N 2681 2681 2681 2681 2681 2681
R2 0.004 0.037 0.065 0.065 0.090 0.095
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Monthly Quote on an auto insurance policy providing Constant Liability
Coverage (Rural)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed -3.108 5.564 6.072 6.490 5.780 6.439
(13.18) (17.30) (17.00) (16.66) (16.72) (16.84)
Prior approval 5.481 3.633 2.296 -0.235 -0.986
(15.98) (16.19) (16.08) (16.13) (16.16)
Flexible rating 73.40∗ 72.43∗ 69.89∗ 69.39∗ 69.40∗
(42.83) (41.91) (40.23) (40.37) (40.70)
Elevation -0.00403 -0.00388 -0.00361 -0.00327
(0.00293) (0.00290) (0.00289) (0.00312)
Income -0.508∗∗ -0.591∗∗ -0.558∗
(0.239) (0.243) (0.284)
No. of accidents 0.470 0.455
(0.406) (0.396)
Proportion of
black population 11.87
(33.10)
cons 136.7∗∗∗ 121.8∗∗∗ 126.9∗∗∗ 149.4∗∗∗ 151.5∗∗∗ 148.2∗∗∗
(6.860) (19.02) (19.17) (19.49) (19.46) (23.81)
N 2681 2681 2681 2681 2681 2681
R2 0.001 0.144 0.155 0.169 0.174 0.175
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Monthly quote on an autombile insurance policy brought by a Rich Voter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote Quote
Appointed 2.545 8.758 9.126 9.459 8.781 8.977
(14.29) (16.47) (16.37) (16.16) (16.31) (16.38)
Prior approval 1.626 0.284 -0.778 -3.221 -3.445
(16.32) (16.75) (16.61) (16.86) (17.14)
Flexible rating 67.99∗ 67.28∗ 65.27∗∗ 64.45∗ 64.45∗
(34.17) (33.61) (32.28) (32.40) (32.51)
Elevation -0.00293 -0.00281 -0.00272 -0.00262
(0.00279) (0.00276) (0.00276) (0.00296)
Income -0.403 -0.461∗ -0.450
(0.247) (0.242) (0.284)
No. of accidents 0.394 0.390
(0.435) (0.431)
Proportion of
black population 3.535
(33.49)
cons 138.7∗∗∗ 127.4∗∗∗ 131.2∗∗∗ 149.0∗∗∗ 150.8∗∗∗ 149.9∗∗∗
(9.311) (18.76) (19.56) (20.71) (20.60) (24.15)
N 2681 2681 2681 2681 2681 2681
R2 0.000 0.129 0.135 0.144 0.148 0.148
Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system of auto insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a Flexible Rating system of auto
insurance regulation, 0 otherwise; Elevation is the geographical altitude of the zip code; Income
(in thousands) is the average income of the households in the zip code; No. of accidents is
the number of motor vehicle accidents as reported in a county in which the zip code is located;
Proportion of black population is the proportion of black population living in the zip code.
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Summary statistics: Auto Insurance Premiums per registered vehicle
written by the industry in a state
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Liability Premiums (LP) (in $ mn) 1,863 2,179 130 11,000 255
Collision Premiums (CP)(in $ mn) 817 1,001 61 6,200 255
Comprehensive Premiums (CmP) (in $ mn) 394 397 42 2200 255
LP per vehicle 377 136 176 1149 255
CP per vehicle 164 53 78 479 255
CmP per vehicle 88 30 48 271 255
Appointed 0.78 0.41 0 1 255
Accident rate 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.43 255
Theft rate 0.3 0.3 0.01 0.3 255
Prior approval 0.31 0.46 0 1 255
Flex rating 0.078 0.269 0 1 255
GDP per capita (’000) 49.2 19.4 29.9 182.7 255
State GDP (in $ bn) 285 346 24 2,000 255
State Population (’000) 5,978 6,665 534 37,000 255
Liability Premiums is the premiums (in $ mn) sold by the industry on the liability coverage
component of auto insurance policies written in a state; Collision Premiums is the premiums (in
$ mn) sold by the industry on the collision coverage component of auto insurance policies written
in a state in a year; Comprehensive Coverage is the premiums (in $ mn) sold by the industry
on the comprehensive coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state; LP per
vehicle is the liability premiums written by the insurance industry per registered vehicle in a
state; CP per vehicle is the collision premiums written by the insurance industry per registered
vehicle in a state; CmP per vehicle the collision premiums written by the insurance industry
per registered vehicle in a state; Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the
Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Accident rate is the number of motor vehicle
accidents per 1000 registered vehicles; Theft rate is the number of motor vehicle thefts per 1000
registered vehicles; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has
a prior approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating is a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise.
50
Table 1.13: Difference of Means (t-test): States with Elected vs Appointed regulators
Variable Mean Difference Std. Errors(Diff.) N
Liability Premiums per car 373 -9.3 39.51 51
Collision premiums per car 156 -2.27 13.30 51
Comprehensive premiums per car 85 8.6 7.17 51
Accident rate 0.14 0.04∗∗∗ 0.017 51
Theftrate 0.003 0.0004 0.0005 51
GDP per capita 51,780 -3,411 7,271 51
State GDP 302,202 78,412 1,25,455 51
State Population 6,072,498 1,503,650 2,328,774 51
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: State Level results: Determinants of Liability premiums written by the
industry per registered vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE OLS
Appointed 28.70 70.70∗ 126.3∗ 109.8∗ 108.2∗ 110.0∗ 92.47∗ 77.35
(33.40) (41.90) (66.03) (58.62) (56.28) (56.52) (49.77) (47.36)
Prior approval 101.5∗∗ 79.14 78.96 81.84 61.56 70.51 75.9∗
(44.17) (61.03) (55.00) (53.17) (50.87) (44.46) (41.98)
Flexible rating 18.13 -34.35 -15.97 -14.98 -3.609 13.47 29.21
(27.39) (56.56) (46.92) (41.55) (43.66) (30.75) (25.44)
Accident rate 1716.8∗∗∗ 1367∗∗ 1395.4∗∗ 1419.7∗∗ 893.9 276.7
(622.0) (568.7) (574.4) (574.3) (564.2) (333)
Theft rate 16,077∗∗ 15,047∗ 14705.4∗ 12,427∗∗ 23,892∗∗
(7,535) (7,709) (7,505) (5,862) (8,822)
GDP per capita (in $ ’000) 1.1 .98 1.52∗∗ -1.5
(0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (1.4)
State GDP (in $ bn) 0.13 0.23 0.58
(0.19) (0.26) (0.40)
State Population (in ’000) -0.001 -0.006 -0.027
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Cons 362.1∗∗∗ 295.9∗∗∗ -4.200 8.474 -24.86 -49.74 -2.1 254.2∗∗∗
(27.04) (46.53) (115.9) (109.1) (114.3) (123.5) (132.2) (90.40)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
N 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
R2 0.01 0.109 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.367
The dependent variable is the liability premiums written per registered vehicle; Appointed is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Accident rate is the number
of motor vehicle accidents per 1000 registered vehicles; Theft rate is the number of motor vehicle thefts per
1000 registered vehicles; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior
approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a
prior approval system, 0 otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For specifications with Random Effects, R2 is the Overall R2
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Table 1.15: State Level results: Determinants of Collision premiums written by the
industry per registered vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE OLS
Appointed 13.29 23.25∗∗ 46.52∗∗ 36.25∗∗ 35.73∗∗ 36.66∗∗ 32.22∗∗ 25.97∗∗
(12.62) (10.92) (22.91) (17.03) (15.77) (14.79) (13.09) (10.76)
Prior approval 24.71∗∗ 15.38 15.49 17.27 8.827 11.23 13.23
(12.46) (20.59) (15.73) (14.73) (14.17) (12.54) (10.46)
Flexible rating -12.79 -34.75 -23.44 -23.33 -18.44 -14.51 -7.99
(11.66) (30.18) (23.18) (20.29) (20.61) (16.44) (11.98)
Accident rate 718.2∗∗∗ 496.0∗∗ 526.4∗∗ 535.2∗∗ 394.6∗ 153.7
(268.1) (235.6) (238.9) (237.7) (221.2) (125.4)
Theft rate 9,448∗∗∗ 8,463∗∗∗ 8,313∗∗∗ 7,794∗∗∗ 11,050∗∗∗
(3108) (3209) (3118) (2547) ( 2738)
GDP per capita (in $ ’000) 0.7∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ -0.39
(0.000247) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4)
Stategdp (in $ bn) 0.08∗ 0.09 0.2∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
State Population (in ’000) -0.002 -0.003 -0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
cons 158.3∗∗∗ 143.7∗∗∗ 11.01 24.12 -6.70 -12.05 8.14 95.26∗∗∗
(9.970) (12.27) (50.41) (45.35) (45.94) (48.41) (48.34) (26.87)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
N 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
R2 0.019 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.40 0.46 0.49 0.55
The dependent variable is the collision premiums written per registered vehicle; Appointed is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Accident rate is the number
of motor vehicle accidents per 1000 registered vehicles; Theft rate is the number of motor vehicle thefts per
1000 registered vehicles; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior
approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a
prior approval system, 0 otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For specifications with Random Effects, R2 is the Overall R2
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Table 1.16: State Level results: Determinants of Comprehensive premiums written
by the industry per registered vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE OLS
Appointed -1.8 -2.8 11.1 5.6 5.4 5.6 2.7 3.29
(7.9) (7.6) (11.6) (9.8) (9.6) (9.7) (8.9) (8.2)
Prior approval -2.3 -7.8 -8.0 -7.4 -8.3 -6.7 -6.9
(7.1) (9.5) (7.9) (7.5) (7.8) (7.0) (6.3)
Flexible rating 0.5 -12.5 -6.5 -6.4 -5.8 -3.2 -3.08
(12.3) (18.7) (15.2) (14.8) (14.7) (13.0) (12.4)
Accident rate 428∗∗∗ 316∗∗ 325∗∗ 326∗∗ 238∗ 237∗∗∗
(160) (138) (140) (142) (136) (71)
Theft rate 5,466∗∗∗ 5,141∗∗∗ 5,129∗∗∗ 4,499∗∗∗ 4,657∗∗∗
(1167) (1231) (1235) (815) (1327)
GDP per capita (in $ ’000) 0.2∗ 0.2 0.3∗∗∗ 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
Stategdp (in $ bn) 0.02∗ 0.04 0.08∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
State Population (in ’000) -0.001 -0.002 -0.01∗∗
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.002)
cons 86.41∗∗∗ 87.84∗∗∗ 20.18 25.24 9.808 10.88 21.65 35.00∗∗
(6.954) (7.700) (26.12) (23.70) (27.75) (29.96) (29.98) (16.08)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
N 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
R2 0.004 0.006 0.194 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.560
The dependent variable is the comprehensive premiums written per registered vehicle; Appointed is a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Accident rate is
the number of motor vehicle accidents per 1000 registered vehicles; Theft rate is the number of motor vehicle
thefts per 1000 registered vehicles; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state
has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For specifications with Random Effects, R2 is the Overall R2
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Chapter 2
The Firms’ response to Rate
Regulation
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I showed that selection mechanism of the state insur-
ance regulator has a significant impact on the premiums on auto insurance policies
paid by consumers. The elected regulator, because of re-selection incentives, prefers
lower premiums on auto insurance premiums as compared to appointed regulators.
This effect is more visible for individuals living in areas which have a higher concen-
tration of state’s population. The state level data too suggests that in states with
elected regulators, auto insurance premiums per registered vehicle written by the in-
surance industry are lower as compared to states which have an appointed insurance
regulator. This is true for premiums written on liability and collision coverage com-
ponent of auto insurance policy which accounts for over 90 percent of total premiums
written by auto insurance firms.
In this chapter, I discuss how the industry responds to rate regulation by the
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Office of Insurance Commissioner. The theory of elected vs appointed regulator sug-
gests that appointed regulators are pro-industry (Besley and Coate (2003). However,
this claim does not hold in the context of state insurance markets and state insur-
ance commissioners. This is because in states with appointed commissioners, higher
premiums per vehicle does not translate into higher profits for the industry (Grace
2008). Hence, it is evident that in the insurance markets, appointed regulators are not
necessarily pro-industry. But it is interesting to understand how the extra revenue
is distributed amongst the various stakeholders, i.e., the government, producers and
consumers.
The key to the puzzle lies in understanding the structure of the state insurance
markets and the regulatory environment. The state insurance markets in the US has a
large number of participants in the Property & Casuality and Life Insurance segment.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) reports that in 2013, Alaska
had 733 domestic and licensed and foreign insurers while Wisconsin had about 2102
domestic and foreign insurers. Hence state insurance markets are characterized by the
presence of a large number of competing firms. I provide evidence that in a market
with a large number of firms where prices are regulated, firms compete with each
other on the quality of the product to attract consumers. Payments made by the
insurance firms on auto damage claims filed by the policyholders are substantially
lower in states with elected commissioners. Since auto damage claims are not a
salient issue for voters, this aspect of the insurance policy is left unregulated by the
regulators. As a matter of fact, no state has enacted a law to establish how insurance
companies should process claims and payments. Hence, lower premiums on auto
insurance policies in states with elected insurance commissioners is accompanied by
lower quality of the product.
In this chapter, I argue that appointed regulators are not necessarily pro-
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consumer and appointed regulators are not necessarily pro-industry. I present evi-
dence that elected regulator offers policies which are salient for most consumers but
these policies are not necessarily pro-consumer. For example, elected regulators of-
fer lower prices (which is salient for most consumers) but lower quality. Appointed
regulators on the other hand allow the insurance firms to charge higher premiums on
auto insurance policies but competition between various insurance firms ensure that
companies use the extra revenues to reach out to consumers by improving the quality
of the product. The insurance firms could be using the extra revenue on other things
like marketing. However, a lack of data on various other aspects makes it difficult to
make such comparisons.
As discussed earlier, an auto insurance policy has three components: liability
coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage. In the previous chapter, I
had shown that states with premiums written per registered vehicle on liability and
collision coverage components of an auto insurance policy is higher in states with
appointed insurance commissioners as opposed to states with elected insurance com-
missioners. However, there seems to be no impact of differences in the selection mech-
anism of the regulators on the premiums written by the industry on comprehensive
coverage. Liability and collision coverage account for 90 percent of total premiums
written by the insurance industry. Since comprehensive coverage is not salient for
most consumers (reflected by only 10 percent market share), elected regulators, too,
do not prefer lower premiums charged on it by auto insurance firms.
The dollars paid out on auto damage claims filed by policy holders by the
insurance industry reflect similar trends. Dollars paid out on auto damage claims
paid out by the auto insurance firms is substantially higher in states with appointed
insurance commissioners on liability and collision coverage claims. Since there is no
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impact of the selection mechanism of the regulator on premiums written on com-
prehensive coverage, there is also no impact of the same on dollar value of the auto
damage claims paid out by the insurance industry.
2.2 Data
The data on the number of claims filed by policy holders on the liability, colli-
sion and comprehensive coverage of auto insurance policy is available from Automobile
Insurance Database Report (AIDR) by National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC). This report also provides information on status of rate regulation in
a state. This data is available for 50 states for a period of five years from 2007 to
2011. The data on dollars paid out by the insurance industry on auto damage claims
is also available from AIDR. Information on whether the state has an elected or ap-
pointed Insurance Commissioner is available from National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). Historical data on Gross Domestic Product (state-wise) for
all states and regions in the United States is available at Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for variables used in the analysis of auto
damage claims paid by the insurance industry.
2.3 Econometric Specification
To estimate the determinants of claims paid out on the auto insurance policies,
I estimate the following equation using the random effects model. I also show the
results using the OLS specification. The results are clustered at the state level and
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Payments by the industry on Automobile Damage
Claims (state aggregates)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Payments (liability) 1,261 1,483 5.4 7,722 250
Payments (collision) 505 579 41 3,750 250
Payments (comprehensive) 228 200 19 1,086 250
No. of claims (liability) 219 241 16 1,350 250
No. of claims (collision) 150 174 12 1,147 250
No. of claims (comprehensive) 227 199 23 907 250
Appointed 0.78 0.42 0 1 250
Prior approval 0.32 0.47 0 1 250
Flex rating 0.08 0.27 0 1 250
The payments are in $ mn; the No. of claims are in $ thousand; Payments (liability) is the aggregate
payments by the insurance industry on claims related to liability coverage;Payments (Collision) is the
aggregate payments by the insurance industry on claims related to collision coverage; Payments (Com-
prehensive) is the aggregate payments by the insurance industry on claims related to comprehensive
coverage; No. of claims (Liability) is the number of claims made on liability coverage in a state in
a year; No. of claims (Collision) is the number of claims made on collision coverage in a state in a
year; No. of claims (Comprehensive) is the number of claims made on liability coverage in a state
in a year; Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is
appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a
prior approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a
state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise
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uses data from the year 2007 to 2011.
Payments = α0 + α1(Premiums)st + α2(No. of Claims)st+
α3(Appointed) ∗ (No. of Claims)st + α4Prior Approval ∗ (No. of Claims)st+
α5FlexibleRating ∗ (No. of Claims)st + α6(GDP )st + α7(Population)st + yi + est
(2.1)
where Payments is the total amount of dollars paid out by the insurance
industry on auto insurance policies; Premiums have three components: Premi-
ums on Liability Coverage, collision coverage and comprehensive coverage respec-
tively. Liability Coverage Premiums is the premiums (in $ ) sold by the industry
on the liability coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state;
CollisionCovrage Premiums is the premiums (in $ ) sold by the industry on the
collision coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state in a year;
ComprehensiveCoverage Premium is the premiums (in $ ) sold by the industry on
the comprehensive coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state;
No. of claims is the number of claims filed by consumers on auto insurance policies
in a state in a year; Appointed is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
the insurance commissioner is appointed in the state in which zip-code i is located,
0 otherwise; ;Prior Approval is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
the state has a prior approval rate regulation system, 0 otherwise; FlexibleRating is
the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the state has a flexible rating rate
regulation system, 0 otherwise; y represent year dummies; e is the error term. s and
t are state and year subscripts.
60
2.4 Results and Conclusion
Standard economic theory apprises us that in competitive markets, firms
operate on zero profits. However, using state-level data, Grace et al. (2008) found
no evidence of impact of selection mechanism of an insurance commissioner on unit
price which is an indicator of profits of the industry. I have provided evidence to
explain this result. In states with appointed commissioners, firms wither away the
extra revenues on account of higher premiums by making higher payments per claim.
Since firms charge a higher premium per vehicle on liability and collision coverage
in states with appointed commissioners, firms make higher payments on claims on
liability and collison coverage respectively in such states. As shown in Table 2.2,
insurance industry pays out $ 370 more per claim on liability coverage in states with
appointed commissioners. Similarly, in table 2.3, industry paid out $ 344 more per
claim on collision coverage in states with appointed commissioners.
Since premium per vehicle on comprehensive does not seem to be related
to the selection mechanism of the commissioner, payments on claims too, are not
associated to the selection mechanism of the commissioner. These results are robust
to both random effects model and ordinary least squares estimation procedure (table
2.4).
Firms tend to make higher payments per claim in states with a higher degree
of rate regulation. This result is in consonance with higher premiums associated with
greater regulation. Hence, competition compels firms to offer a better product when
they are able to charge higher premiums.
Hence, I provide evidence that firms respond to regulatory interventions by
altering the quality of the product. Firms can alter the quality through payments
because there are no laws in any state which gives the commissioner the power to
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regulate payments made by firms on claims filed by policyholders. Firms could also
be spending extra revenues in other ways (e.g. marketing) to aggressively attract
customers. However, data to test such claims are not available. Hence, I provide
evidence that in a market with multiple competing firms, elected regulators offer pro-
consumer policies to a select group of consumers. However, lower premiums result in
a low-quality product. On the other hand, firms are able to charge higher premiums
on auto insurance policies. But competition forces firms to use the extra revenue to
offer a better quality product (e.g. lower payments per claim).
Interventions by the regulator may also have welfare effects for individuals.
High-risk drivers would be worse off living in states with an elected commissioner
whereas, low-risk drivers would be worse off living in states with an appointed com-
missioner. To conclude, elected regulators do choose policies which are salient for
consumers. However, having an elected regulator does not lead to pro-consumer mar-
ket outcomes. Similarly, having an appointed regulator does not lead to pro-industry
outcomes.
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Table 2.2: State Level results: Payments on Liability coverage claims
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE RE RE RE RE OLS
Liability Premiums 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
No. of Claims (N) 827 470 -53 127 111 127
(945) (970) (987) (434) (418) (434)
Appointed*N 787∗∗ 1179∗∗∗ 370∗ 370∗ 370∗
(347) (339) (205) (203) (205)
Prior approval*N 950∗∗∗ 282 283 281
(364) (242) (241) (242)
Flexible rating*N 331∗∗ -275 -274 -275
(150) (196) (195) (196)
State GDP -2320∗∗∗ -2331∗∗∗ -2320∗∗∗
(498) (494) (498)
State Population 60 61 60
(38) (37) (37)
cons (in $ ’00,000) 116 -321 228 94 266 266
(635) (548) (293) (267) (207) (207)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y N Y
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
R2 0.932 0.939 0.943 0.951 0.953 0.953
The dependent variable is the aggregate payments by the insurance industry on claims related to liability
coverage in a state in a year; Liability Premiums is the premiums sold by the industry on the liability
coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state; No. of claims is the number of claims
made on liability coverage in a state in a year; Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of
1 if the Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For specifications with Random Effects, R2 is the Overall R2
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Table 2.3: State Level results: Payments on Collision coverage claims
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE RE RE RE RE OLS
Collision premiums 0.21∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
No. of Claims(N) 2208∗∗∗ 1700∗∗∗ 1804∗∗∗ 1826∗∗∗ 1869∗∗∗ 865∗∗
(252) (318) (240) (284) (306) (356)
Appointed*N 185∗∗ 332∗∗∗ 325∗∗∗ 344∗∗∗ 305∗∗∗
(91) (96) (42) (47) (52)
Prior approval* N 359∗∗∗ 322∗∗∗ 334∗∗∗ 156∗
(97) (67) (69) (93)
Flexible rating*N 209∗∗∗ 269∗∗∗ 266∗∗∗ 154∗∗
(72) (80) (82) (76)
State GDP 224∗∗ 204∗ 94
(114) (118) (101)
State Population -8.7 -11.6 4.86
(8.9) (9.3) (7.4)
cons 231∗∗∗ 155∗∗ 232∗∗∗ 249∗∗∗ 163∗∗ 89
(73) (62) (63) (78) (66) (60)
Year dummies (’$ 00,000) Y Y Y Y N Y
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
R2 0.9935 0.9951 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9969
The dependent variable is the aggregate payments made by the insurance industry on claims on auto insurance
in a state in a year; Collision Premiums is the premiums sold by the industry on the collision coverage
component of auto insurance policies written in a state in a year; No. of claims is the number of claims made
on collision coverage in a state in a year; Appointed is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the
Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible rating s a dummy variable which takes the
value of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For specifications with Random Effects, R2 is the Overall R2
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Table 2.4: State Level results: Payments on Comprehensive coverage claims
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE RE RE RE RE OLS
Comprehensive premiums 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11)
No. of Claims (N) 252∗∗ 280∗ 307∗∗ 307∗∗ 419∗∗ 164∗
(102) (161) (139) (157) (168) (133)
Appointed*N -19.5 -48.9 -46.1 -80.8 -10.7
(80) (84) (79) (83) (69)
Prior approval*N -80.3 -82.4 -88.9 -88.9
(88.5) (77.6) (77.6) (65.5)
Flexible rating *N 57.1 69.4 80.7 65.4
(55) (56) (65) (43)
State GDP 110 136 86
(152) (144) (140)
State Population -6.7 -6.1 -7.27
(9.8) (9.6) (8.83)
cons ($ ’00000) -107 -102 -153∗∗∗ -151∗∗ 61 68
(73) (82) (53) (71) (77) (67)
Year dummies (’$ 00,000) Y Y Y Y N Y
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
R2 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.895
The dependent variable is the aggregate payments by the insurance industry on claims related to compre-
hensive coverage in a state in a year; Comprehensive Coverage is the premiums sold by the industry
on the comprehensive coverage component of auto insurance policies written in a state; No. of claims
is the number of claims on comprehensive coverage in a state in a year; Appointed is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if the Insurance Commissioner is appointed, 0 otherwise; Prior approval is a
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise; Flexible
rating s a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a state has a prior approval system, 0 otherwise
Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at state level
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For specifications with Random Effects, R2 is the Overall R2
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Chapter 3
Impact of Market Concentration
on Effective Insurance Premium
Tax Rate
3.1 Introduction
How is the tax policy determined? Industry often lobbies with the regulators
to lower statutory tax rates and procure tax breaks. Media outlets often report
that interest groups belonging to different sectors of the industry exert tremendous
influence on the tax policy. For example, Huffington Post reported that Nissan got
US$ 1.3 billion in tax benefits from the state government of Mississippi 1. The Daily
Beast covered a story on race track owners associated with National Association for
Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) getting tax breaks worth about US$ 40 million
1”Mississippi Cuts $1.3 Billion From Schools, Gives $1.3 Billion to Nissan”, 23rd May 2014, The
Huffington Post.
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a year2. Fox News reported that Senate Finance Committee chairman, Democratic
Sen. Ron Wyden was influential in getting tax breaks of upto US$ 2,500 on the
purchase of an electric motorcycle while pointing out that the two electric motorcycle
manufacturers came from his state of Oregon3.
These media reports are in consonance with the economic literature on regu-
lation. Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) have shown that regulation is a product
of the bargaining process between the interest groups and regulators. In fact, the
literature suggests that political agents maximize their own utility rather than striv-
ing to provide efficient or optimal solutions for the society. For example, regulators
that are appointed (by the Governor) are pro-industry while those elected (by ballot)
are pro-consumer (e.g. Crain and McCormick 1984; Besley & Coate 2003). Warren
(2012) shows that policy outcomes are a result of the interaction between the exec-
utive, legislature and intrinsically motivated bureaucrats. However, the normative
or public interest theories of taxation based on Mirrlee (1971) and Ramsey (1927)
assume that tax policy is exogenous to these competing interests and strategic be-
havior of regulators. Posner (1974) criticized the public interest theories and argued
that ”...a serious problem with any version of the public interest theory is that the
theory contains no linkage or mechanism by which a perception of the public interest
is translated into legislative action”.
In this paper, I propose a positive theory of taxation. I examine the ability
of the interest groups in the insurance industry to affect effective insurance premium
tax rate. To explore the relationship between interest groups and effective tax rate,
I focus on the market concentration in the state insurance markets as a measure
2”8 Ridiculous Tax Loopholes: How Companies Are Avoiding the Tax Man”, 25th Feb 2012, The
Daily Beast
3http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/12/11/44b-giveaway-congress-prepares-to-extend-tax-
breaks-for-horse-owners-green/
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of the ability of the industry to organize itself into an interest group to lobby for
lower taxes. This is in line with the arguments made by Stigler (1971) and Pittman
(1977, 1987) who argued that it is easier for the larger firms to organize themselves
as an interest group because they are able to solve the free rider problem. If we
assume that the costs of lobbying are shared equally by firms, small firms may not
even recover the costs associated with lobbying and hence decide to stay away from
the process. Section 3 contains discussions on theoretical arguments to support the
empirical evidence provided in the paper.
I find that there is a negative relationship between market concentration and
effective premium tax rate in state insurance markets in the US (table 3.3). I use the
‘coast to area ratio’ of a state as a possible source of exogenous variation in market
concentration to address concerns arising out of reverse causality. The instrument, the
‘coast to area’ ratio directly affects the market concentration because being exposed
to catastrophic events pose unique problems for the insurers. Small insurers may
not have sufficient resources to cover the losses when exposed to risks created by low
probability and high-risk events like hurricanes. The problem becomes even more
acute in the absence of reinsurance. Viscusi & Born (2006) show that an unexpected
catastrophe leads to the exit of insurance firms from state and firms with low levels
of homeowners premiums are most adversely affected.
The instrument also satisfies the exclusion criterion. A major concern seems
to be that states exposed to catastrophic events will have higher premiums and a
higher number of insureds. However, it is not clear how this would affect the effective
tax rate. Another concern appears be that states where the insurance industry faces
higher risks associated from catastrophic events, the industry would get greater tax
benefits. However, this is unlikely to be true for the following reasons. After hurricane
Katrina, the effective tax rate in the 4 states most affected by it was higher (1.6
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%) than in other states (1.3 %). Lower tax rates in general would translate into
lower prices and not assist smaller insurance firms in overcoming the risks associated
with ’lumpy’ events like natural disasters. Besides, politicians often care about the
premiums faced by the consumers and in most states they have the regulatory powers
to control the premiums charged by insurance firms. So, they do not have the incentive
to provide tax breaks to insurance firms for this reason.
After employing a number of controls like regulatory features, campaign con-
tributions and size of the economy, and using the two stage least square estimation
method, I find that a 1 percent increase in market concentration causes the effective
tax rate to go down by 0.6 percentage points which translates into about $ 590,000
less in tax revenues collected from the insurance industry. Employing a similar econo-
metric strategy, I examine the causal relationship between market concentration and
insurance premium tax revenues. I find that a 1 percent increase in market con-
centration causes the insurance premium tax revenues go down by 0.8 percentage
points.
This paper, therefore, contributes to the literature on the positive theory of
taxation. The paper demonstrates that when market concentration is higher, it is
easier for the industry to organize as an interest group and influence the regulatory
process. This results in lower effective insurance premium tax rate in states with high
market concentration as demonstrated by the empirical results.
There is substantial economic literature on regulatory capture examining the
influence of interest groups on regulation. Various regulatory issues have been suc-
cessfully analyzed using the interest-group framework. These include environmental
regulation (Maloney and McCormick 1988), the British factory acts (Anderson and
Tollison, 1984), the banning of the importation of slaves into the United States (An-
derson et al., 1988), immigration restrictions (Shugart et al., 1986), apostolic decrees
69
by the Roman Catholic Church (Ault et al., 1987), Luddism (Anderson and Tollison,
1984, 1986), population growth (Tollison 1988), farmer opposition to futures markets
(Pashigian, 1988), amongst others.
A positive theory of taxation based on the interest groups framework was
developed by Tollison. Tollison (1989) argued that higher barriers to entry in politics
make it more difficult for the interests of low-income taxpayers to get representation
in the political process. In such situations, government tends to rely more heavily
on consumption taxes as sources of revenue. Tollison (1990) showed that the group
receiving the benefits of the dedicated revenues has a strong incentive to lobby for
higher effective tax rates.
Another positive theory on taxation emerged from the literature on tax com-
petition which argued that governments compete with each other by lowering tax
rates in an attempt to attract capital and other resources to their jurisdictions (Oates
1972). Devereux et al. (2002) argued that statutory tax rates have declined due to
tax competition. It has also been argued that tax competition has lead to a shift in
tax burden from mobile to immobile tax bases (Winner 2005). Oates (1972) expressed
concern that the result of tax competition may well be a tendency toward less than
the efficient level of the output of local services.
Other studies have shown the effect of political parties and term limits of
governors on tax policy. Warren (2013) found that re-electable Democratic governors
increase income taxes relative to similarly situated Republicans, yielding divergence
between party policy positions. However, governors facing a binding term limit exhibit
the reverse policy difference, resulting in a movement of policy back together. Besley
and Case (1995) found that Democratic term-limited governors set significantly higher
per capita total state taxes and state expenditures than other governors. This liter-
ature again reinforces that regulators are seldom driven by considerations of optimal
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or efficient solutions and inspires further research on a positive theory of taxation.
In this paper, Section 2 provides a brief description of the regulatory environ-
ment in state insurance markets and insurance premium sales tax. Section 3 provides
space for theoretical arguments. Section 4 contains data sources and description.
Section 5 has a discussion on the instrument and the estimation strategy. Section 6
provides a discussion of the results.
3.2 Insurance Premium Sales Tax and Background
Information
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 gave states the sole power over regulation and
taxation of insurance which makes the insurance industry exempt from federal anti-
trust regulations. An insurance firm requires regulatory approval from each state
it wants to operate in. This approval, in the form of a license, is granted by the
insurance regulator often known as the Insurance Commissioner. It is also quite
common for different insurance firms belonging to a parent organization to operate in
multiple segments of the industry. Hence different segments of the insurance industry
are linked to each other because they are part of a strategic decision making by the
parent organization.
Grace (2008) points out that as states are not subject to the commerce clause,
they discriminate against out-of-state companies through taxation. To counter this
discriminatory taxation, states adopted a so-called retaliatory tax. That is, if state A
would tax state Bs companies at a higher rate than its own companies, state B would
tax State As companies at the higher of the two states’ tax rates. Retaliatory taxes
are imposed to tax away any advantage an out-of-state company may have because
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of lower taxes imposed in the state in which the company is domiciled.
To add to the quagmire of tax rates, discriminatory tax rates and retaliatory
tax rates, insurance companies also get tax exemptions and credits in different forms
in different states. For instance, Georgia taxes 2 percent of gross direct premiums.
This rate is reduced to 1 percent for companies having at least 25 percent of total
assets, as defined, located in Georgia. The rate is reduced to half a percent for
companies with at least 75 percent of their assets in Georgia. In Ohio, the tax does
not apply to annuities, deposit type life insurance contract funds, Medicaid payments
received before Oct. 1, 2009, Medicare payments, small employer health care alliance
premiums, or federal crop insurance premiums. Kansas law K.S.A. 40-252d provides
for a tax credit for insurance companies equal to 15 percent of Kansas-based employees
salaries (not including commissions or fringe benefits), or up to a maximum of 1.125
percent of taxable premiums dependent on the company’s affiliation. The company
can claim either the 15 percent credit or up to the 1.125 percent, whichever is less.
This could make the effective tax rate on such companies as low as 0.875 percent4.
These examples are not exhaustive as most states have some kind of tax incentives
for the insurance industry. Hence, actual tax rate that insurance firms face, on an
average in a state, is quite different than the statutory tax rate.
Therefore, I use effective tax rate (which is a percent of the taxes collected
on insurance premiums to total premiums written and annual considerations), as a
variable of interest in this paper. States in the US levy a state premium tax on
the gross premiums written (rather than on profits) by the insurance industry. The
industry is generally exempt from corporate income taxes. $1.67 billion were collected
in taxes on insurance premiums on $1.54 trillion worth of insurance premiums and
annuity considerations in the United States for the year 2012. Hence, this translates
4http://www.kansascommerce.com/index.aspx?NID=447
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into 1.1 percent in effective premium tax rate across the United States. Delaware
had the lowest effective rate of 0.23% while Nevada had the highest effective tax rate
of 2.37%. On an average, premium tax revenues constitute about 2 percent of the
total tax revenues of the state. This proportion is the lowest for Alaska at 0.8% and
highest for Tennessee at 5.3%.
3.3 Theory
Stigler (1971) and Pittman (1977, 1988) provide theoretical arguments on how
market concentration in an industry could be related to the ability of the industry to
influence regulation.
Stigler (1971) argued that small firms and consumers do not organize them-
selves as an interest group to lobby for a desired policy because the costs of organizing
as an interest group are high compared to the benefits. Large firms, on the other hand,
are able to successfully execute collective action. This is because with fewer firms (re-
quired to participate for collective action to happen), costs of organization goes down.
Also large firms are able to solve the free rider problem more effectively.
Pittman (1988) too argued that highly concentrated industries are more likely
to participate in lobbying to get a desired policy because they will be able to solve
the free rider problem.
“However, if the industry in question is unconcentrated, then the firm may
decide that the level of benefits accruing to the industry will be unaffected by its own
level of contributions, so that the benefits may be enjoyed without incurrence of the
costs. Such a calculation may be made by other firms in the industry, of course, with
the result that a free-rider problem prevents firms individually from making political
contributions, even if it is in their collective interest to do so.”
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Pittman (1977) also argues that a firm in a less concentrated industry is more
likely to decide that its participation in the collective action would cause little change
in the occurance of collective action, and the likelihood of the industry receiving spe-
cial consideration. On the other hand, large firms in a heavily concentrated industry
are aware that their participation in the collective action is critical for the collective
action to take place. This will make the collective action in a market with high degree
of concentration more likely.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Effective Tax Rate (τ) is computed by the taking the ratio of revenues collected
through insurance premium tax levied in a state to the total premium written by the
industry in the state in a specific year. Mathematically,
τ = (
Tst
Pst
) ∗ 100 (3.1)
where,
Pst = Plst + Phst + Pp&cst; Plst, Phst and Pp&cst are the premiums written by the
life, health, and property & casualty segments of the insurance industry respectively.
Tst is the insurance premium sales tax revenues as reported by United States Census
Bureau (USCB). Data on premium tax revenues is not available by different segments
of the industry. Hence, it is not possible to estimate the effect of market concentration
on the effective tax rate for each segment.
Market concentration in the insurance industry is the weighted average of
Herfindahl index (HHI) of life, health, and p&c segments, the weights being the
74
proportion of the insurance premiums written by each segment. Mathematically,
Cst = [(
Plst
Pst
) · Clst + (Phst
Pst
) · Chst + (Pp&cst
Pst
) · Cp&cst] ∗ 100 (3.2)
where Cst is the degree of concentration in the insurance industry; Clst, Chst
and Cp&cst are the degree of concentration in the life, health and property & casualty
segment of the insurance industry as indicated by HHI 5; s and t are state and year
subscripts.
Data used for constructing the degree of concentration index in different
segments of the insurance industry is available from SNL Financial database. This
data is available for all 50 states and Washington D.C. I use data over the period
2001-2012. Prior to 2001, SNL Financial database does not have data on health
segment of the insurance industry. In comparison to life and property & casualty
segment of the industry, health insurance segment is highly concentrated. Hence, I
control for the proportion of health insurance segment to ensure that results are not
driven by health insurance segment. The data on Coast to Area ratio which is used
as an instrument is available from Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These numbers
also include the Great Lakes coastlines. The insurance regulator is selected either
through appointment (by the Governor) or election (by ballot). The states where
the insurance regulator is an elected position is Washington, California, Montana,
North Dakota, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Kansas, Georgia, North Carolina
and Delaware. This information is available from National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). In many states, insurance premium tax is collected by the
Office of Insurance Commissioner. Other states have delegated this responsibility to
5Market share of the insurance groups in different segments of industry have been taken into
account while computing Clst, Chst and Cp&cst.
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departments that generally collect taxes (e.g. the Department of Taxation). This
information is available on the websites of the Office of Insurance Commissioner and
other sources on the internet. There are only 14 states where the insurance regulator
is not responsible for the collection of premium taxes. These are Florida, Iowa,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Mississippi, Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon, North
Carolina, Vermont, Connecticut, Texas and Rhode Island. I use a dummy variable to
control for who collects taxes in a state. Historical data on Gross Domestic Product
(state-wise) for all states in the United States is available at Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Data on campaign contributions by the insurance industry to fund state-
level elections is available from National Institute for Money in State Politics. Table
2 provides summary statistics. None of the data are adjusted for inflation.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Tax rate 1.3 0.6 0.17 2.9
InsTax 288,263 355,290 13,313 2,416,073
Premiums 24,810 26,622 1,132 160,000
Appointed
Regulator 0.784 0.412 0 1
Tax agency 0.7 0.458 0 1
Concentration 12.78 6.06 3.68 71.56
HHI (Life) 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.75
HHI (P&C) .05 0.009 0.03 0.11
HHI (Health) 0.38 0.20 0.08 0.99
Campaign Contributions 700,500 1,883,479 50 21,013,742
Taxrate is the effective tax rate as defined previously; InsTax is the insurance premium sales tax
revenues collected in state s and year t; Premiums is the total premiums written (in thousands)
by the industry in state s and year t; Regulator=1, means Insurance Commissioner is appointed,
=0 means Insurance Commissioner is elected; Tax Agency=1, means that the insurance premium
sales tax revenue is collected by the Office of Insurance Commissioner, 0 otherwise; Concentra-
tion captures the degree of concentration in the insurance industry as defined above; Campaign
Contributions is the campaign contributions made by the insurance industry in state s and year
t in state elections;
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3.5 Estimation Framework
3.5.1 Instrument Variable
To estimate the impact of market concentration on the effective tax rate, I use
the coast to area ratio of a state as a source of exogenous variation in the market
concentration. This instrument is valid subject to two conditions.
First, being exposed to the water bodies affect the market concentration in the
insurance industry. The first stage results (table 4) corroborate this claim. There is a
positive association between coast to area ratio and market concentration even after
employing a variety of controls. The results are robust under different specifications
and clustering at the state level. States having higher exposure to water bodies
face greater risks from natural catastrophes and hence significant liabilities for the
insurance firms operating in that state. In 2010 over 39% of the population of the
US lived on the coast as per the US Census Bureau. The average population density
of coastal shoreline counties is 446 persons per square miles as compared to national
average of 105 persons per square miles. Clearly, any natural disaster along the coast
will have a potential to inflict greater damage on life and property. Estimated overall
losses caused by natural disasters in the United States for the years 2005-2014 stood
at $621.5 billion. Tropical cyclones and flooding alone accounted for 56 percent of
total losses. During this period, tropical cyclones and flooding also accounted for
52% of total insured losses faced by the industry. Besides, cyclones and flooding
accounted for the highest number of fatalities (refer to table 2 for details). Viscusi
& Born (2006) show that unexpected catastrophe leads to the exit of insurance firms
from state and firms with low levels of homeowners premiums are most adversely
affected. They argue that in the absence of adequate reinsurance, the firm may go
bankrupt or may choose to exit a state in which there is a substantial exposure to such
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catastrophic risks. They provide examples. In response to losses incurred following
Hurricane Katrina, which accounted for over $38 billion in insured losses, a major
insurer, Allstate, exited several coastal states while another, State Farm, chose not
to renew some policies in these areas6. The fourth-largest insurer in Florida, Poe
Financial, went bankrupt7. Hurricane Andrew too caused 9 insolvencies.
The State of Florida’s 2nd Annual Report on Property Insurance Market for
Florida Legislature (January 2013) expresses similar concerns. The coast to area ratio
for Florida is one of the highest among all states. According to this report, a high
number of insurance companies are exiting the Florida market and there is a lack of
companies entering to replace them; growing number of insurance companies are no
longer writing new policies in Florida; there is a lack of insurance company formation
in Florida and a slowdown in the growth of capital to support premiums written by
primary insurers in Florida is slow.
Grace & Klein (2002) highlight that insurers have sought to raise prices and
decrease exposure to losses. However, the state legislature and insurance regula-
tors have resisted insurers’ responses to increased risks in an attempt to preserve
the availability and affordability of insurance. Further, they find that in New York
and Florida, demand for catastrophe insurance is more price elastic than for non-
catastrophic coverage, thereby putting pressure on the insurers. They also find that
consumers prefer high-quality solvent insurers in Florida.
Second, the exclusion restriction implied by the instrumental variable regres-
sion is that, conditional on other independent variables in the regression, the coast to
area ratio has no effect on effective tax rate, other than their effect through market
concentration. Such concerns have already been discussed above. Therefore, I assume
6The Price of Sunshine, The Economist, June 8, 2006, p. 76 as reported by Viscusi & Born
(2006)
7Viscusi & Born (2006)
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that this instrument is fairly exogenous.
Table 3.2: NATURAL DISASTER LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005-2014
Type Frequency FatalitiesOverall Losses Incurred Losses
Tropical cyclone 38 1786 320 170
Severe thunderstorms 802 1606 180 120
Floods 183 292 30 5.5
Winter storms,
cold wave, blizzards 122 760 25 15
Earthquake and
Geophysical 31 5 1.5 0.4
Wildfire, Heat,
Drought 291 542 65 25
This table is taken from the website of Insurance Information Institute. Overall Losses and Incurred
Losses are estimated figures in billion dollars
3.5.2 Econometric Model
I primarily focus on the effective tax rate but also show the results of the causal
effect of market concentration on premium tax revenues (in table 3.6). I include state
and year time fixed effects and results are robust to clustering at the state level. The
first stage regression equation is
ˆln(concentration)st = β0 + β1ln(coast2area)si + β2regulatorsti
+β3ln(campaigncontributions)sti+β4DemocratGovernorsti+β5ln(totaltaxcapita)si
+ β6prophealthsti + β7taxagencysti + β8populationsti + β10vt + β11fs + est (3.3)
where lnconcentration is the log of market concentration. coast2area is
the ratio of the length of the coast to the land area in the state. regulator is
a dummy variable; it takes the value of 1 if the insurance regulator is appointed
(by the Governor) and 0 if elected (by ballot). campaign contributions is the
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funds provided by the insurance industry for state elections. Democrat Governor is
a dummy variable; it takes the value if the Governor of the state is from Democratic
party. ln(totaltaxcapita) is the total tax revenues collected per capita in a state.
prop-health is the fraction Phst
Pst
. tax agency is a dummy variable; it takes the
value of 1 if the premium taxes in the state are collected by the Office of insurance
commissioner, 0 if taxes are collected by the state tax department. v and f are state
and year dummies.
Hausman test for endogeneity shows that the market concentration is endoge-
nous. The first-stage relationship between market concentration and coast to land
area ratio in a state is positive: coast to land area ratio is significantly related to
market concentration at over 99 percent confidence, and this relationship is robust to
state and year fixed effects and clustering at the state level. Anderson-Rubin (AR)
test and Wald Test for weak instruments underline the strength of the instrument.
AR test is significant for every specification at around 5 percent level. Table 3.4
provides the first stage results.
The second stage estimates the impact of market concentration on tax rate is
given by the following model.
ln(taxrate)st = β0+ ˆln(concentration)st+β2regulatorsti+β3ln(campaigncontributions)sti
+ β4DemocratGovernorsti + β5ln(totaltaxcapita)si
+ β6prophealthsti+
+ β7taxagencysti + β8populationpsti + β9vt + β11fs + est (3.4)
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The results are robust to clustering at the state level and includes time and
state fixed effects. Table 3.5 provides the results.
As an additional check, I also use the econometric framework described above
to analyze the impact of market concentration on premium tax revenues. The results
are reported in Table 3.6.
3.6 Results
I estimate several different specifications to check the robustness of the results.
I also add a variety of controls motivated by theoretical arguments made by other
studies. I also add controls to account for the regulatory environment. I find that
market concentration affects the effective tax rate. A 1 percent increase in market
concentration is associated with 0.6 percent reduction in effective tax rate. I get
similar results for insurance premium tax revenues. Table 6 provides evidence that a
1 percent increase in market concentration leads to 0.8 percent increase in premium
tax revenues. These results clearly show that when it is easier for the industry to
organize itself into an interest group, the industry manages to have a greater impact
on regulation and get tax benefits. However, this is an average effect. It is likely that
the insurance firms that lobby capture tax benefits only for themselves.
The selection mechanism of the insurance regulator seems to matter for market
concentration but not for effective tax rate. States with an appointed insurance
regulator has a lower degree of market concentration and lower effective tax rate.
However, for effective tax rate, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Studies
have shown that appointed regulators are more likely to provide benefits for the
industry while elected regulators facing electoral pressures, bend towards consumers
(e.g. Crain and McCormick 1984; Besley & Coate 2003). Insurance Commissioners
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do not play a direct role in determining premium tax rates (which are determined
by finance committees appointed by the state legislatures). However, if the elected
regulator favors a few insurance firms in lieu for campaign contributions, it will lead
to an increase in market concentration in states with elected commissioners. However,
these arguments require further corroboration.
Generally an insurance group operates in different segments of the industry
in a state by floating different firms. Hence, it is possible that decision making in
one segment is influenced by the decision making in another segment. However, as
compared to life and p&c segments of the insurance industry, health segment has
a much higher degree of market concentration. Hence, I control for the premiums
written by the health insurance firms as a fraction of the premiums written by the
entire insurance industry. I also find a small but significant association of the size of
the economy with the effective tax rate.
In some states, the premium tax is collected by the Office of Insurance Com-
missioner. Results suggest a strong positive association between such states and
effective tax rate. Besides there is a negative association between such states and
premium tax revenues collected. Further research is required to derive any meaning-
ful conclusions from these findings.
This paper contributes to the literature on the positive theory of taxation.
The paper shows that interest groups have a strong influence on the tax policy. While
economists know about the association of market concentration with industry prof-
itability and other economic variables. This paper shows that degree of concentration
affects the regulatory outcomes. When few firms are large enough, then it becomes
easier to organize the industry as an interest group and capture the regulatory process.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Effective Premium Sales Tax: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ)
ln(Concentration) -0.33∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
ln(Population) -0.36 -0.39 -0.34 -0.60 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56
(0.69) (0.66) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68)
Prop health 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.39) (0.39) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
ln(Total tax
per capita) 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
ln(Campaign
Contributions) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Democrat Governor 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tax Agency 1.9∗∗∗ 0.7
(0.09) (0.9)
Appointed regulator -1.8
(2.7)
cons 1.5∗∗∗ 6.4 6.7 5.9 9.2 8.9 7.0 10.1
(0.2) (9.1) (8.7) (8.7) (9.1) (9.1) (9.0) (10.9)
State & Year
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 588 588 588 588 562 562 562 562
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Standard errors in parentheses
Taxrate is the effective tax rate as defined previously; InsTax is the insurance premium sales tax
revenues collected in state s and year t; Premiums is the total premiums written (in thousands)
by the industry in state s and year t; Regulator=1, means Insurance Commissioner is appointed,
=0 means Insurance Commissioner is elected; Democrat Governor=1, means Governor is from
Democratic party, =0 means Governor is from Republican party; Tax Agency=1, means that
the insurance premium sales tax revenue is collected by the Office of Insurance Commissioner,
0 otherwise; Concentration captures the degree of concentration in the insurance industry as
defined above; Campaign Contributions is the campaign contributions made by the insurance
industry in state s and year t in state elections;
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Determinants of the (log of) Effective Premium Tax Rate (Reduced Form).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) ln(τ) τ
ln(Concentration) -0.84∗ -0.50∗ -0.50∗ -0.66∗ -0.61∗ -0.61∗∗ -0.61∗∗ -0.61∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.28) (0.28) (0.36) (0.34) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.39)
ln(Population) -0.70∗ -0.79∗ -1.10∗ -1.19∗ -1.18∗ -1.18∗ -1.18∗ -1.74
(0.40) (0.47) (0.66) (0.64) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) ( 1.25)
Prop health 0.49 0.95 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.37
(0.87) (1.12) (1.02) (0.92) (0.92) (0.92) ( 1.47)
ln(Total tax
per capita) 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
ln(Campaign
Contributions) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 .0001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (.007)
Democrat Governor -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Tax agency 2.2∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗ 2.6∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.36)
Appointed regulator -1.8 -2.5
(1.2) ( 2.5)
cons 2.9∗∗ 11.4∗∗ 12.6∗ 16.9∗ 17.9∗∗ 17.8∗∗ 15.7∗ 17.5∗ 27.6
(1.3) (5.5) (6.6) (9.2) (8.8) (8.4) (8.2) (9.3) (19.4)
N 588 588 588 588 562 562 562 562 562
R2 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.81
Standard errors in parentheses
Taxrate is the effective tax rate as defined previously; InsTax is the insurance premium sales tax
revenues collected in state s and year t; Premiums is the total premiums written (in thousands)
by the industry in state s and year t; Regulator=1, means Insurance Commissioner is appointed,
=0 means Insurance Commissioner is elected; Democrat Governor=1, means Governor is from
Democratic party, =0 means Governor is from Republican party; Tax Agency=1, means that
the insurance premium sales tax revenue is collected by the Office of Insurance Commissioner,
0 otherwise; Concentration captures the degree of concentration in the insurance industry as
defined above; Campaign Contributions is the campaign contributions made by the insurance
industry in state s and year t in state elections;
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Insurance Premium Tax Revenues and market concentration: Two stage
least squares estimation
(First Stage) (Reduced Form)
ln(market concentration) ln(Premium Tax Revenue)
log (coast to land area) 16.5*** -
(5.3)
log (market concentration) - -0.85*
(0.35)
ln(Population) -2.6* -1.9
(1.4) (1.2)
Prop health 2.5** 2.1*
(0.9) ( 1.3 )
ln(Total taxes) 0.09 0.28
( 0.09) ( 0.19 )
ln (Campaign contributions) -0.004 -0.002
(.008) (0.007 )
Democrat Governor -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03 )
Tax agency -63.258*** -0.85***
( 20.9) ( 0.3)
Appointed Regulator -7.4** -4.8**
( 3.4) ( 2.3)
State and year dummies Y Y
N 562 562
Robust standard errors in parentheses
F statistic for the First Stage is 166 and R-square for the Reduced Form is 0.95
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.005
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Table 3.6: Insurance Premium Tax Revenues and market concentration: Two stage
least squares estimation
(First Stage) (Reduced Form)
ln(market concentration) Premium Tax Revenue
log (coast to land area) 16.7*** -
(5.3)
log (market concentration) - -593.7***
(0.35)
ln(Population) -2.5* -1267
(1.4) ( 762)
Prop health 2.5** 1498*
(0.9) ( 692 )
ln(Total taxes) 5.8e-06 0.02***
(3.9e-06) ( 0.004 )
ln (Campaign contributions) -0.004 -1.9
(.008) ( 4.8)
Democrat Governor -0.03 -31.0*
(0.03) (18.3)
Tax agency -64.5*** 584.1***
( 20.5) ( 160.6)
Appointed Regulator -7.4** -2180**
( 3.4) (1552.3)
State and year dummies Y Y
N 562 562
Robust standard errors in parentheses
F statistic for the First Stage is 166 and R-square for the Reduced Form is 0.95
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.005
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